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I. Introduction
As the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 continues to
reverberate across the global economy, 1 financial regulation
remains at the forefront of public discourse. 2 The underlying
causes of the crisis still generate controversy. 3 By any measure,
however, the financial institutions at the center of the financial
crisis are special for many reasons. 4 Increasingly, these businesses
1. See, e.g., ADAIR TURNER, BETWEEN DEBT AND THE DEVIL 213 (2015)
(“Seven years after the 2007–2008 financial crisis the world’s major economies
are still suffering its consequences.”); Maximilian Walsh, Financial Crisis Still
Not Over Seven Years After Lehman Brothers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV. (June 3,
2015), http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/financial-crisis-still-not-over-sevenyears-after-lehman-brothers-20150603-ghfmkn#ixzz3pijkm4di (last visited Dec.
11, 2016) (“The Great Recession—the one we were not supposed to have—is now
seven years old and, despite the best efforts of an army of professional economists,
recovery remains tentative.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Donna Borak, Donald Trump, Jeb Hensarling Meet on Dodd-Frank
Alternative, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donaldtrump-jeb-hensarling-meet-on-dodd-frank-alternative-1465335535 (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (highlighting the debate over Jeb Hensarling’s plan to repeal 2010
Dodd–Frank law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Compare Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008
Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2011) (assigning primary cause of
the financial crisis to derivatives deregulation), with Steven A. Ramirez, The
Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic
Perspective, 45 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 669, 720 (2014) (“[A]t bottom, massive
securities fraud defines the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and led to an historic
financial collapse.”). The financial crisis of 2008 was a highly complex event and
its causes are similarly complex. See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS
CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW
(2013) [hereinafter RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM] (comprehensively identifying
all legal and regulatory flaws contributing to the financial crisis). Sound risk
management in the financial sector could apply to mitigate many if not all of these
putative causes.
4. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 57 (5th ed. 2013) (debating whether banks are “special” enough to
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demonstrate a uniquely “public” character. 5 While historically
some financial firms may have organized as partnerships 6 and the
consequences of their decision-making perceived as “private,” 7 in
the contemporary period, the great financial crisis reveals that
decisions made in the inner-sanctum of these businesses may
adversely affect domestic and international economies and the
public at large. 8 Many such institutions engineered and invested
in high risk financial instruments that ultimately generated large
losses. 9 These losses triggered a run on the shadow banking
sector 10 and later crippled the conventional banking sector and
spelled calamity for the global economy. 11 Ultimately, the entire
receive unique regulatory treatment).
5. In conventional corporations jargon, describing a business as “public”
intimates that the company has registered securities with the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) for sale to the public. This Article invokes a more
creative understanding of “publicness.” See infra Part III.A (exploring the concept
that institutions perceived as “systemically important financial institutions” or
“too big to fail” may have incentives to internalize the benefits of excessive risk
taking and export the negative consequences; these negative externalities may
spill over to the broader domestic and international communities).
6. See, e.g., LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 15
(2009) (describing the history of the ownership structure of Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc.).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part III.B (explaining private transactions that are exempt
from federal regulations).
9. See infra Part III.B (describing how exotic derivatives allowed banks to
re-sell debt absent federal oversight).
10. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO.
458, SHADOW BANKING, at 1 (2010), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (explaining how “the shadow banking system
provide[s] sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term
assets into money-like, short-term liabilities”). There is no universally agreed
upon definition for shadow banking. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow
Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review of
Banking & Financial Law, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 623, 626 (noting that
“we lack a concrete definition of shadow banking” while also emphasizing that “a
high level of institutional demand for (especially) short-term debt instruments”
was a critical factor in the growth of what is now “known as the ‘shadow banking
system’” (citation omitted)).
11. See TYLER ATKINSON ET AL., DALLASFED, HOW BAD WAS IT? THE COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2007–09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (July 2013),
https://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf (estimating
total cost of crisis in United States alone at up to fourteen trillion dollars).
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financial sector benefited from the federal bailout of the industry. 12
Remarkably, the homogenous demographic make-up of the senior
management teams 13 changed very little after the financial
crisis. 14
For almost a century, a complex web of federal legislation was
purportedly designed to protect the general public from the
negative consequences of financial institutions’ business
decisions. 15 Banking laws for example, include specific capital and
reserve requirements, governance mandates, and detailed
licensing standards, to reduce systemic risk. 16 Federal securities
laws include an intricate mandatory disclosure framework for
public companies to protect investors and to promote efficient and
transparent markets. 17
Commentators frequently posited that the culture within
financial firms encouraged flouting rules. 18 Many claimed that the
insular settings reinforced biases and encouraged excessive
12. For example, the Federal Reserve System lent trillions to 407 financial
institutions during the darkest days of the crisis. See Phil Kuntz & Bob Ivry, Fed’s
Once-Secret Data Compiled by Bloomberg Released to Public, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
23, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-23/fed-sonce-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public (last visited Dec. 15,
2016) (reporting that total federal lending reached sixteen trillion dollars) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY AND AGENCIES AFTER THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
10, 15 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653814.pdf.
14. See generally EMMA JORDAN COLEMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A FAIR
DEAL FOR TAXPAYER INVESTMENTS 1 (Sep. 2009), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/09/pdf/public_directors.pdf (finding
that one year after the financial crisis “92 percent of the management and
directors of the top 17 recipients of TARP funds are still in office”).
15. See id. at 4 (introducing the Troubled Asset Relief Program intended to
rescue failing financial systems).
16. See id. at 8 (attempting to create a central federal bank to increase
market liquidity by cutting rates).
17. See id. at 5 (restoring trust and public confidence is critical to maintain
future market stability).
18. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
xix (2011) (indicating that the primary government inquiry into the causes of the
financial crisis found that “stunning instances of governance breakdowns and
irresponsibility” within financial firms drove all aspects of the crisis as a key
cause).
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risk-taking
across
financial
markets. 19
Unprecedented
20
compensation and brazen behavior, buttressed by perceptions
that decisions made on behalf of the firm would have limited
consequences for individual senior managers, created an
environment devoid of accountability. 21 The fact that these
institutions sported little cultural diversity did not escape notice. 22
A veil of “privateness” obscured many of the complex financial
products and transactions that facilitated the crisis. 23 Regulators
19. See, e.g., The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis: Before the
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (claiming unregulated, low interest rates
encouraged consumer borrowing and excessive leverage); Viral V. Acharya &
Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 195
(2009)
[Financial institutions] had temporarily placed assets—such as
securitized mortgages—in off-balance-sheet entities, so that they did
not have to hold significant capital buffers against them . . . [and that]
the capital regulations . . . allowed banks to reduce the amount of
capital they held against assets that remained on their balance
sheets—if those assets took the form of AAA-rated tranches of
securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mortgagebacked securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks
reduced the amount of capital required against their loans, increasing
their ability to make loans many-fold. The principal effect of this
regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage
defaults in the banks and render them insolvent when the housing
bubble popped.
Id.; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011)
(describing the assumption that “too big to fail” institutions will receive
public financial support during economic crises).
20. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay,
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 247 (2010) (discussing how executives’ insulation from losses
leads to a disregard for long-term risk-taking effects).
21. See generally MARY K. RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE
CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 1–28
(2017); Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts,
88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 227 (2013) [hereinafter Governing Financial Markets]
(discussing how federal government bailouts coupled with unregulated controls
encourage directors to make risky management decisions).
22. The United States Government Accountability Office found that as of
2011 senior managers in the financial sector were eighty-nine percent whites and
seventy-one percent males. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at
10, 15. These numbers changed little from the numbers prevailing before the
Great Financial Crisis at the senior manager level. Id.
23. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at xx (indicating that
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and lawmakers deemed large financial institutions to be “too
sophisticated to regulate” and acted to exempt them from
regulation. 24 Notwithstanding the litany of existing federal
regulation, expanding notions of “privateness”—and concomitant
deregulation—dominated the pre-crisis period. 25 Even financial
institutions that were publicly-traded companies successfully
evaded conventional disclosure mechanisms for financial
instruments that were too complex to depict. 26 When the crisis
erupted in the fall of 2007, both public and private institutions
clamored to gain direct or indirect access to federal bailout funds. 27
The crisis revealed flaws in federal regulation of financial
institutions’ risk management oversight. 28
For decades, scholars have posited that introducing greater
diversity among decision-making authorities, such as the board of

major financial institutions were able to hide high leverage ratios from public
investors).
24. See id. at xviii (explaining that regulating major financial firms was
thought unnecessary because self-preservation supposedly shielded them from
fatal risk-taking).
25. See id. at xx (“Key components of the market . . . were hidden from
view . . . We had a 21st-century financial system with 19th-century safeguards.”).
26. See id. at 8 (depicting the increasingly complex financial instruments
that “became too hard to ‘untangle’” within the securities market).
27. See id. at 256 (“[A] handful of banks were bailing out their money market
funds and commercial paper programs in the fall of 2007 . . . .”).
28. As used in this Article, the term risk management means the
mechanisms by which the business enterprise manages all risks facing the
enterprise. Thus, it transcends the mere use of financial instruments to hedge
portfolio positions and is closely associated with enterprise-wide risk
management (ERM). See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide
Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 571, 586
(2008) (defining enterprise-wide risk management as “enhanced financial
management through enhanced identification and management of all the risks
facing the corporation” and showing that “[t]his systematic and comprehensive
approach to risk management has been empirically tested and the results show
that ERM delivers upon its theoretical promises”). Congress and the financial
regulators enhanced ERM regulatory requirements in the aftermath of the
financial crisis. See Kristin Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act:
Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55,
63 (2011) [hereinafter Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act] (stating that risk
management “involves organizational processes that generally include risk
identifying, measuring, and mitigating procedures”).
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directors and senior executives, could lead to superior outcomes. 29
As Christine Lagarde, former Minister of Economic Affairs,
Finance and Employment of France and Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) eloquently argued, if “Lehman
Brothers had been ‘Lehman Sisters,’ today’s economic crisis clearly
would look quite different.” 30 Referencing a study examining a
sample of banks around the world that demonstrates that less than
twenty percent of bank board members are women and only three
percent of bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are women, 31
Lagarde described the need for greater gender diversity on
financial institution management teams. 32 Former Citigroup Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) Sallie Krawcheck shared similar
reflections, positing that in her experience “diverse teams . . . tend
to make more effective decisions . . . [because] they bring in more
perspectives.” 33
While examples of egotism and bravado abound, 34 critics posit
that these anecdotes only demonstrate well-established moral or
29. See infra Part II (finding that maintaining homogenous groups will draw
unoriginal ideas and provide a stagnant information base).
30. Christine Lagarde, Women, Power and the Challenge of the Financial
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/opinion/
11iht-edlagarde.html?dbk (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
31. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech at the
Institute for New Economic Thinking: Financing and Society (May 6, 2015).
32. See id. at 1 (“[E]stablishing a culture where ethical behavior is rewarded
and where lapses in ethical integrity are not tolerated. More women would also
help. Several studies have shown female leadership is more inclusive.”).
33. Sallie Krawcheck, How “Lehman Siblings” Might Have Stemmed the
(Aug.
6,
2014,
12:54
PM),
Financial
Crisis,
PBS NEWSHOUR
http://www.pbs.org/fnewshour/making-sense/how-lehman-siblings-might-havestemmed-the-financial-crisis/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. Consider, for example, the email messages of Fabrice Tourre, a creator
of the infamous Abacus transaction. See Chris V. Nicholson, Fabrice Tourre:
Fabulous or Fatally Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:49 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/fabrice-tourre-fabulous-or-fatally-flawed/
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“The whole building is about to collapse anytime
now . . . . Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] . . . standing in
the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without
necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrosities!!!”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the
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ethical deficiencies in the cowboy culture of Wall Street. Scholars
long ago began finding benefits from well-managed diversity but
some argue more evidence is needed to make the case in favor of
greater diversity. 35 The challenges that all businesses face with
respect to decision-making and managing risk introduce a set of
questions that merits exploration. When one considers the risk
management failures 36 that large and systemically important
Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1209, 1226 (2011) (“This emotional and social account meshes fairly well with
what we observe inside highly competitive financial firms. There is a strong
emotional emphasis on team building and bonding—fraternity-like excesses
included.”);
Recall the claim that the bankers’ culture is of-the-moment and bows
to the innate legitimacy of the market mechanism, seeking an
unquestioning synchronicity with it . . . this view probably cannot be
construed as a belief in the unerring accuracy of the market at any
given moment so much as a Hayekian view of the necessary freedom of
persons and firms to be tested in the crucible of the marketplace.
Id. at 1237.
35. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L.
BUS. FIN. 85, 85–87 (2000) (collecting sources regarding the advantages of a
diverse workforce). More recently, scholars recognize that while well-managed
diversity may lead to superior board performance, the empirical data on the mere
presence of diverse board members is mixed. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K.
Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference
Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 393 (2014) (“Although empirical research has
drawn much-needed attention to the underrepresentation of women and
minorities on corporate boards, it has not convincingly established that board
diversity leads to improved financial performance.”); Lissa Lamkin Broome &
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?,
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432–33 (2008) (“Recent quantitative studies primarily test
for a relationship between board diversity and various measures of corporate
performance. . . . [S]tudies find evidence that . . . board diversity positively affects
firm performance. Other studies, however, find no support for this theory.”); Lisa
M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 593 (2006)
(summarizing the empirical data addressing the impact of diversity contingent
upon the number of women in the boardroom). We do not address this debate
regarding general board diversity in this Article, instead focusing on the potential
benefits of diversifying the financial sector from top to bottom, that is, from the
boardroom down to rank-and-file workers.
36. See Kristin N. Johnson & Steven A. Ramirez, New Guiding Principles:
Macroprudential Solutions to Risk Management Oversight and Systemic Risk
Concerns, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386, 426 (2014) (recognizing continued reliance
on corporate governance-oriented reforms will ultimately increase market
disruptions and recounting risk management failures before and during the
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financial institutions endured during the financial crisis, 37 these
questions become all the more poignant.
To address shortcomings in federal regulatory oversight and
the risk management failures, Congress adopted the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–
Frank Act). 38 The Dodd–Frank Act introduces many
transformative risk oversight policies. 39 Among the reforms,
Congress created an obligation for financial regulators to assess
the gender and racial diversity policies of financial institutions. 40
This Article focuses on Section 342(b)(2)(c) of the Dodd–Frank Act
which directs each federal financial regulatory agency to assess the
diversity policies and practices of entities regulated by the
agency. 41 The Article concludes that the Dodd–Frank Act
appropriately focused on diversity as one mechanism to achieve
superior risk management in the financial sector, and that
regulators should more aggressively implement Congress’s
statutory directive.
Part II of this Article focuses on the growing empirical
evidence in the psychology, finance, and management literature
that demonstrates that cognitive biases influence group
decision-making and that well-managed cultural and gender
diversity can breakdown these cognitive biases. In terms of
finance, this translates into superior risk management as diverse
groups hold more heterogeneous perspectives on risk, ethics, and
market decisions in a way that can lead to superior outcomes on
these issues.
financial crisis).
37. See Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 28, at 71–72
(describing risk management failures of various firms and subsequent solvency
crises during the period 2007–2011).
38. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet
reform-cpa.pdf.
39. See id. § 111(a) (enhancing supervision and regulation through
establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council).
40. See id. § 342(a)(1)(B) (mandating the formation of the Office of Minority
and Women Inclusion to develop standards for racial, ethnic, and gender
diversity).
41. See id. § 342(b)(2) (requiring the agency administrator and Office of
Minority and Women Inclusion Director to design implementation procedures and
remedies resulting from violation).

1804

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016)

Part III posits that increasingly blurred lines challenge our
understanding of private businesses. Increasing federal regulation
illustrates a trend toward presumptions that systemically
important financial institutions, in particular, are public in
nature, even if private by design. The macroeconomic significance
of large financial institutions justifies more stringent
macroprudential regulation across the financial sector.
Part IV offers a brief survey of the issues at the center of
financial markets regulation: academics’ understanding,
practitioners’ experience, and regulators’ best efforts to identify,
implement and enforce risk management policies intended to
promote macroeconomic stability and macroprudential risk
management. Sound risk management in the financial sector plays
a key role in dealing with regulatory and legal challenges arising
from the increased public stakes in banking and finance.
Part V of this Article examines the Congressional mandate for
imposing an obligation for regulatory agencies to “assess” the
diversity policies and practices of financial institutions regulated
by the agency. Part VI contends that the transformative changes
in financial markets coupled with risk management lessons from
the recent crisis demand a more aggressive interpretation of
financial market regulators’ obligations to “assess” diversity at
financial institutions. This Part of the Article posits that the
regulators should use their traditional authority to stem unsafe
and unsound banking practices (and similar prudential
regulations) to encourage more diversity in the financial sector.
Otherwise, the regulators risk undermining Congressional efforts
to mitigate risk management challenges in financial markets and
ensure macroeconomic stability and macroprudential regulation. 42
Section 342, while not suggesting that the increasing diversity
alone solves risk management oversight concerns, offers a partial
response to known risk management weaknesses in senior
management teams in the financial sector. 43 Congress correctly
42. Enhanced risk management figured prominently in the Dodd–Frank Act.
See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act §165(h)(3)(A) (requiring certain systemically important
financial institutions to form independent “enterprise-wide risk management
committees”).
43. Long before the financial crisis scholars debated the business benefits of
diversity:
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identified a major shortcoming in the corporate governance of the
financial sector. According to the joint standards promulgated by
the federal regulatory agencies, 44 Section 342’s mandate will only
require a voluntary self-assessment of diversity-oriented risk
management initiatives. 45 This Article demonstrates that federal
regulatory agencies’ interpretation of Section 342 frustrates
Congress’s intentions regarding diversity as a risk management
tool. At best, agency efforts stymie or undermine the potential for
the statutory mandate. At worst, the federal regulatory agencies’
interpretation leaves Section 342 completely impotent creating
greater potential for macroeconomic destabilization. 46 As such, an
The point here goes back to my metaphor of the firm as a nexus of
negotiations. The promotion of diversity may or may not hold a position
of power within the firm. If I am right [about potential costs] its power
rarely will be great. Simple demands of adherence because of the
rightness of the cause are unlikely to provoke a cooperative response
among those who disagree on (perhaps self-serving) principled
grounds.
Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite:
Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1615, 1642 (2004); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest
Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to
Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004) (“CEOs play the game of
homosocial reproduction when they select directors . . . [b]ut, because board
diversity can improve corporate governance, racial reformers may find many
allies . . . in this arena.”).
44. See Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for
Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the
Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33016 (June 10, 2015) [hereinafter Joint Guidelines]
(discussing the contentious public commentary over the standards promulgated
by the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2015-06-10/pdf/2015-14126.pdf. The Article refers to this group of
regulatory agencies as the “financial regulators.” Id.
45. See infra Part V (providing a detailed explanation of the Joint Standards
that apply to regulated entities).
46. Under a law and macroeconomics approach, the focus is on the
relationship of law and regulation to macroeconomic performance. See Steven A.
Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515,
519 (2003) (“[L]aw can further economic output and other macroeconomic goals.”).
Macroprudential regulation considers the use of law and regulation to secure
financial stability on a systemic basis and therefore looks beyond prudential risk
regulation at just single financial institutions. See Kristin N. Johnson,
Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial
Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 903–04 (2013) [hereinafter Macroprudential
Regulation] (explaining systemic risk and the consequences that flow from the
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opportunity to both diversify and stabilize the financial system has
so far been wasted. 47 The simple remedy may be for federal
financial regulators to execute their mandate, enforce the statute
through the broadest possible regulatory powers, and consider
cultural and gender diversity in the financial sector as a key
mechanism to enhance risk management and legal compliance in
the financial sector.
II. The Empirical Foundation for Enhanced Diversity in Finance
Scholars from a range of disciplines have long studied group
decision-making challenges arising in part from culturally
homogenous groups. 48 Among other limitations, groupthink, 49

interconnectedness of financial institutions). Major financial institutions operate
under pervasive public supervision because their activities can lead to severe
financial instability with all of the negative economic consequences inherent in
such crises, and because the largest financial firms hold a poorly defined claim on
massive public resources for their survival. See Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge
Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L.
REV. 405, 449–50 (2016) [hereinafter Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?]
(arguing in favor of enhanced regulation of hedge funds given the enhanced
publicness of their activities).
47. The Joint Guidelines state that they “create no new legal obligations,”
and that the financial regulators “will not use their examination or supervisory
processes in connection with the [Joint Guidelines].” Joint Guidelines, supra note
44, at 33. As such, they truly constitute “lip service” and defy the plain meaning
of the statute, which requires an “assessment” of each regulated entity’s diversity
policies. See 15 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2) (2012) (imposing director-created standards to
increase agency’s participation with minority-owned and women-owned
businesses).
48. See, e.g., IRVING R. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 78 (1978) (discussing
problems associated with “groupthink”).
49. Groupthink is “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity
overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of actions.”
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1238 (2003) (quoting JANIS, supra note 48, at 78).
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herd behavior, 50 and affinity bias 51 challenge group decisionmaking. Similarly, humans naturally fall prey to confirmation
bias, 52 overconfidence, 53 and structural bias. 54 These flaws in
cognition lead to an inclination to look for and adopt information
that confirms intuitive beliefs and a tendency toward selective
information gathering and deference to superiors such as
executives or managers based on perceptions that such team
members are better informed. 55 Evidence suggests that these
tendencies can be mitigated through enhanced cultural diversity. 56
50. Financial crises frequently arise from herd behavior—a dynamic
whereby decision-makers rely on the decisions of others rather than just their
own information. See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107
Q.J. ECON. 797, 800 (1992) (finding that herd behavior may explain asset price
volatility). Commentators note that the financial crisis was an instance of
“herd-effects” and self-reinforcing judgments derived solely from the judgments
of others. TURNER, supra note 1, at 40.
51. Affinity bias results from the inability of humans to make decisions free
of bias relating to those we share affinity with through friendship, social status,
or other socially significant relationships. See Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and
the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 248–49 (showing
that affinity bias may infect board deliberations).
52. See id. at 265 (searching for information supporting current beliefs but
ignoring contrary information).
53. See id. at 280 (pointing to “naïve realists” who falsely believe their
decisions are always objective in nature).
54. See O’Connor, supra note 49, at 1265 (noting that impartial leaders may
also cause structural faults as they state their own views but discourage dissent).
55. See id. at 1238 (striving for unanimity prevents individuals from
considering alternative courses of action).
56. See, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE 6 (2012) (finding that “companies with at least one woman on the
board would have outperformed in terms of share price performance” and that
“[a]lmost all of the outperformance . . . was delivered post-2008, since the macro
environment deteriorated and volatility increased”); David A. Carter et al.,
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51
(2003) (“After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance
measures, we find statistically significant positive relationships between the
presence of women or minorities on the board and firm value . . . .”); Toyah Miller
& María del Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: Mediators
of the Board Diversity–Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755,
774–75 (2009) (finding that between 2002 and 2005 Fortune 500 firms with
gender and racial diversity on boards performed better than non-diverse firms
and finding that the link can be explained through innovation and firm
reputation). The focus of this Article is on cultural diversity within the financial
firms, from top to bottom. Thus, we do not address here the efficacy of board
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In fact, discrete cultural differences exist in the U.S. with respect
to many important issues, including risk perceptions and ethical
sensitivities. 57
These lessons also hold true in the world of finance. For
example, evidence supports the conclusion that greater
participation by women senior executives may militate against
solvency concerns for banking institutions. 58 There is strong
empirical support for the conclusion that women executives exhibit
less over-confidence and hold different perceptions of risk relative
to men. 59 A sample of 6,729 banks during the financial crisis
diversity alone beyond the financial sector. Compare Joan M. Heminway, Women
in the Crowd of Corporate Directors: Following, Walking Alone, and Meaningfully
Contributing, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59, 79 (2014) (arguing that
increasing the number of women on boards could enhance diversity because
“[r]esearch offers evidence that women may bring game-changing perspectives
and proficiencies to the boardroom”), with Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity
Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 855 (2011)
(challenging generally the reliance on business rationales to justify increased
board diversity and “insists that diversity advocates must pay greater attention
to the role of social and moral justifications in the effort to diversify the corporate
boardroom”).
57. For example, as early as 2007, scholars recognized that white-male risk
perceptions were skewed. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk
Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 465–66 (2007) (“Numerous studies
show that risk perceptions are skewed across gender and race: women worry more
than men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad dangers—from
environmental pollution to hand guns, from blood transfusions to red meat.”).
Legal scholars suggested this white-male risk perception should be balanced in
the name of reducing bias, unfairness, and poor governance simultaneously. See
Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity
Rationale, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 585, 594 (2011) (“This Article proposes that
greater worldview diversity on corporate boards may lead to better governance
and mitigate bias and unfairness in corporate decision making.”).
58. See Ajay Palvia et al., Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More
Conservative and Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the
Financial Crisis, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 577, 592 (2015) (concluding test results offer
a positive correlation between female CEOs and lower risk of bank failure);
Kristin Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial
Firms’ Risk Oversight, 69 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–33)
(citing sources and studies exploring the significance of gender in the context of
risk-management oversight) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
59. See, e.g., Jiekun Huang & Darren J. Kisgen, Gender and Corporate
Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?, 108
J. FIN. ECON. 822, 822 (2013) (finding that “[m]ale executives undertake more
acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives” and that female
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revealed that banks with women CEOs or board chairmen held
more conservative levels of capital after controlling for, among
other attributes, the risks in the bank’s asset portfolio, the size of
the bank, and the economic conditions in the bank’s state. 60 When
women serve as the heads of banks, the banks tend to hold greater
amounts of capital, which enables the bank to guard against
insolvency concerns. 61 The “observed differences in capital ratios
are economically significant and indicate that female-led banks
hold about 5-6% more capital than male-led banks.” 62 These more
conservative levels of capital translated into a lower risk of bank
failure. 63 As such, a rigorous analysis of cultural diversity
“complement[s] . . . evaluating the safety and soundness of
banks.” 64 Though some may argue that this finding means women
are superior risk managers, 65 we argue only that heterogeneous
executives give earnings guidance with wider ranges); Mara Faccio et al., CEO
Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation, SOC. SCI.
RES. NETWORK (Feb. 12, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2021136 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“[F]irms run by female CEOs
tend to make [less risky] financing and investment choices . . . than . . . firms run
by male CEOs . . . CEO transitions indicates that . . . firm [risk-taking] tends
to . . . around the transition from a male to a female CEO (or vice-versa).”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See Palvia et al., supra note 58, at 592 (“From a public policy perspective,
the documented benefits of female leadership for bank stability may be of interest
to regulators when setting future policies for promoting gender equality and the
advancement of women in business.”).
61. Id. at 582 (acknowledging that the sample size is small because women
are so underrepresented at the top of financial sector).
62. Id. at 592.
63. See id. (reporting that banks led by female CEOs hold higher levels of
equity capital due to their control over the bank’s asset risk).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., JULIA DAWSON ET. AL., THE CS GENDER 3000: WOMEN IN SENIOR
MANAGEMENT 3 (2014) (“[G]reater diversity in boards and management are
empirically associated with higher returns on equity, higher price/book valuations
and superior stock price performance.”). Interpreting empirical data on cultural
diversity and bank risk management is, of course, complicated. First, as always,
there are limits on empirical research. As with virtually all empirical studies,
variables may be omitted; the sample size may be too small; the direction of
causation may not be clear; and virtually all methodologies have noteworthy
shortcomings. Id. Further, for businesses, too much risk aversion may be
undesirable. This Article simply highlights the best evidence on the issue of
whether risk management can be optimized through enhanced cultural diversity
in the financial sector.
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risk management is superior to culturally homogenous risk
management.
Similarly, another study of subprime lending at financial
firms found that firms with more female representation engaged
in less subprime lending. 66 Utilizing a database of subprime
lenders from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Professors Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn matched
subprime lenders with non-subprime lenders by size and industry
and found that board configuration in the two sets of firms differed
in statistically significant ways. 67 Specifically, the non-subprime
lenders had boards with more gender diversity, longer board
tenure, and were less busy. 68 The study design mitigates issues
relating to causation by splitting the firms into two subsets
(subprime lenders and non-subprime lenders) and focusing on the
explanatory variables the year prior to any firm entering the
subprime mortgage market. 69 The study finds “that board gender
diversity adds value to a board.” 70 Furthermore, “[t]he greater the
percentage of women on the board, the less likely a firm was to
specialize in subprime lending.” 71 In short, the deterioration of
mortgage lending standards underlying the subprime debacle may
have been preventable had there been greater diversity on
financial institution boards. 72
66. See generally Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board
Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE:
AN INT’L REV. 405 (2011).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 412–13; see also id. at 409 (defining busyness as the number of
outside board seats held by each outside director divided by the number of outside
directors).
69.
[R]everse causality is less plausible, given our research design. In our
empirical tests, all of our independent variables are collected in the
year preceding the firm identified on the subprime list. Thus, measures
for our explanatory [variables] in the earlier period could not have
resulted from being identified as a subprime specialist in the
subsequent period.
Id. at 409
70. Id. at 414 (“For enhanced decision making processes, firms would be
advised to strive to add diversity to boardrooms.”).
71. Id. at 413.
72. Id. at 405. Another recent study involving European banks found that
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Even beyond boards and senior managers, diversity pays
dividends in terms of risk management in the financial sector. One
study found that female loan officers are more risk averse and
more inclined to restrict loans to unseasoned borrowers. 73 Another
study found that female loan officers also experience lower default
rates on loans they approve relative to male loan officers. 74 These
studies suggest that financial firms would experience gains for
diversifying all levels of operations, not just senior management
teams. 75
The above empirical studies also draw support from a rich
body of empirical evidence that shows that diversity necessarily
results in different approaches to risk. As early as 1988,
researchers showed in experimental studies that women tend to be
more conservative and risk averse than men. 76 These findings were
confirmed by empirical studies that investigated household
investment behavior and personal financial decisions. 77 In sum,
according to a review of all experimental studies in the Journal of
boards with more women had lower risks. See generally Ruth Mateos de Cabo et
al., Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards of Directors, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS
145 (2012).
73. See Andrea Bellucci et al., Does Gender Matter in Bank-Firm
Relationships? Evidence from Small Business Lending, 34 J. BANKING & FIN.
2968, 2968–69 (2010) (examining the impact of gender on business lending
practices).
74. See Thorsten Beck et al., Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan
Officers?, 17 REV. FIN. 1279, 1317 (2013) (studying the performance differences
between male and female loan officers).
75. See id. at 1282–83 (“These findings suggest that not only the
institutional and governance structure of financial institutions matters, but also
the gender of the people operating in a given bank structure.”); see also Bellucci
et al., supra note 73, at 2969 (suggesting that female loan officers are more risk
averse than men in order to avoid defaults and losses for their institutions and
maximize personal career advancement).
76. See Irwin P. Levin et al., The Interaction of Experiential and Situational
Factors and Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task, 122 J.
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 180 (1988) (finding that women students were more risk averse
than male students in an experimental setting).
77. See, e.g., John Watson & Mark McNaughton, Gender Differences in Risk
Aversion and Expected Retirement Benefits, 63 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 52, 60 (2007)
(“Considerable psychological evidence suggests that women are generally more
risk averse than men . . . and the results of this study indicate that this
heightened risk aversion influences the superannuation/retirement investment
choices women make.”).
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Economic Literature, “[a] large literature documents gender
differences in risk taking; women are more risk averse than
men.” 78 This empirical reality does not necessarily suggest that
women inherently manage risk better than males; in fact, at least
one study suggests that the risk aversion of females may
negatively impact earnings. 79 We may, however, conclude that
heterogeneous risk assessments, including a diversity of
perspectives offers greater informational elaboration. 80
This empirical reality also applies to the approach of ethnic
minorities to issues related to risk. A recent analysis of the extant
empirical evidence on this point found that white males are the
most aggressive demographic group in terms of investment
behavior. 81 African-American and Hispanic households also
display more risk aversion than white households in their
investment choices in the wake of the Great Recession. 82 In
78. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1, 7 (2009).
79. See Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Men, Women and Risk
Aversion: Experimental Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
RESULTS 1061, 1069 (Charles R.C. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) (detailing
studies that show, generally, systematic differences between male and female
reaction to risk(citing HAIM LEVY ET AL., GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RISK TAKING AND
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (1999) (unpublished
manuscript))).
80. Our theory is rooted in the work of psychologists that found group
intelligence can exceed the intelligence of any single member, particularly when
the group is diverse. See Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a Collective
Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCI. 686, 688 (2010)
(“[R]esults provide substantial evidence for the existence of [collective
intelligence] in groups . . . .”). An alternative theory also supports our thesis that
the financial regulators should take stronger steps to encourage more diversity in
the financial sector. Specifically, some argue that males are over-confident and
systemically underestimate risk. See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, How Men’s
Overconfidence Hurts Them as Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14mark.html?_r=0 (last visited
Dec. 15, 2016) (examining differences in investment behavior between women and
men) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See James Farrell, Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors of Investors,
in INVESTOR BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND INVESTING
117 (H. Kent Baker & Victor Ricciardi eds., 2014) (compiling and reviewing
empirical studies focusing on the differences in investment behavior across race
and gender groups).
82. See Su Hyun Shin & Sherman D. Hanna, Decomposition Analyses of
Racial/Ethnic Differences in High Return Investment Ownership after the Great
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addition to approaching risk differently, ethnic diversity also may
help avoid and mitigate financial market bubbles. 83
A recent study, published in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, by a team of six economists, business
scholars, and other academics from around the world found that
markets with diverse participants resist price bubbles. 84 The team
constructed experimental financial markets in Southeast Asia and
North America. 85 Market participants were randomly assigned to
participate in diverse or culturally homogenous markets. 86 The
culturally diverse markets fit true values fifty-eight percent better
than the homogenous markets. 87 In addition, the homogenous
market overpriced assets and trader errors were more correlated. 88
This all suggests that homogenous markets are more prone to
bubbles than culturally diverse markets.
As the authors of the study conclude:
Markets are central to modern society, and their failures can
devastate people, communities, and nations. We find that price
Recession, 26 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING 43, 57 (2015) (examining home
ownership, risk tolerance, and education across varying demographic groups).
83. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18524 (2014) (“Our results suggest that bubbles
are affected by a property of the collectivity of market traders—ethnic
homogeneity.”).
84. See id. at 18527 (“[T]raders in diverse markets reliably price assets closer
to true values. They are less likely to accept inflated offers and more likely to
accept offers closer to true value, thereby thwarting bubbles.”).
85. See id. at 18525 (explaining how the researchers selected the geographic
sites of the experiments to purposely exploit non-overlapping ethnic diversity in
those two locales and to generalize their findings beyond rich, developed nations).
In North America, the diversity tested was whites, Latinos, and AfricanAmericans. Id. In Southeast Asia, the researchers studied diversity in the form of
Malays, Indians, and Chinese traders. Id.
86. See id. at 18525–26 (detailing how the experiment involved skilled
traders with training in business or finance and outlining how—because the
traders in the experiments received their earnings in cash at the end of the
experiment—they faced incentives to trade effectively).
87. See id. at 18526 (“Across markets and locations, pricing accuracy is 58%
higher in diverse markets.”). Pricing accuracy was obtained by giving participants
all information needed to price the stocks accurately, and the initial declarations
of value formed the baseline for trading accuracy. Id. at 18525.
88. See id. at 18524 (“In homogenous markets, overpricing is higher and
traders’ errors are more correlated than in diverse markets.”).
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bubbles are fueled by the ethnic homogeneity of traders.
Homogeneity, we suggest, imbues people with false confidence
in the judgment of coethnics, discouraging them from
scrutinizing behavior. In contrast, traders in diverse markets
reliably price assets closer to true values. They are less likely to
accept inflated offers and more likely to accept offers that are
closer to true value, thereby thwarting bubbles. This pattern is
similar in Southeast Asia and North America, even if the two
sites differ greatly in culture and ethnic composition, in what is
implied by “ethnic diversity” and how it is operationalized. 89

In short, this study demonstrates that if the bank regulators
are concerned with the systemic risks of bubbles they should
aggressively seek to diversify the financial sector with the full
panoply of tools provided by Congress. 90 This would vindicate
macroprudential regulation needs by securing less volatile
financial markets.
Ethics and compliance concerns also counsel in favor of
aggressive steps to diversify the financial sector. 91 Apparently the
different approach of women to issues relating to risk also leads to
more ethical behavior and legal compliance. 92 According to one
recent study, female CEOs exercise more conservativism with
respect to accounting issues. 93 Another study found that female
89. Id. at 18527. The results are based upon 2,022 transactions by 180
traders in thirty different markets—fourteen diverse and sixteen homogenous.
Id. The market with the lowest accuracy was the homogenous market in North
America—i.e., the market with all white traders. Id.
90. See infra Part V (articulating the means by which the financial
regulators can use the tools at their disposal to more aggressively diversify the
financial sector).
91. See William A. Weeks et al., The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on
Ethical Judgment, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 301, 310–11 (1999) (“[I]t appears that an
influx of more females into the work force might improve the ethical environment
based on how ethical problems are perceived and resolved.”).
92. Id. Social scientists theorize that women approach ethics differently
based upon gender socialization. See Leslie Dawson, Ethical Differences Between
Men and Women in the Sales Profession, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1143, 1143–44 (1997)
(“This theory holds that general and nearly universal differences that
characterize masculine and feminine personalities are formed in childhood and
are incontrovertible; these in turn differentially shape the work-related interests,
concerns, and values of the sexes.”).
93. See Simon S.M. Ho et al., CEO Gender, Ethical Leadership, and
Accounting Conservatism, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 351, 366 (2015) (“Regardless of the
measure of conservatism, we find consistent evidence that companies with female

DIVERSIFYING TO MITIGATE RISK

1815

board representation leads to fewer accounting restatements. 94
The authors suggest that this finding is consistent with the
disruption of groupthink and superior group decision-making
dynamics. 95 Similarly, at least with respect to Chinese firms, when
there is more gender diversity on the board, there is less securities
fraud. 96 Women are more likely to speak out against unethical
behavior and blow the whistle on misconduct than males. 97
Finally, there is additional empirical evidence that AfricanAmericans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and whites have different
ethical sensitivities. 98
These differences in ethical sensibilities suggest that business
would be well-advised to diversify in order to assure that its
behavior conforms to the ethical expectations of all its key
constituencies—labor pools, supply chains, capital sources,

CEOs report earnings more conservatively.”).
94. See Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Female Board Presence and the Likelihood
of Financial Restatement, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 607, 626 (2012) (“Using a matchedpair sample of restatement and control firms, we conducted conditional logistic
regressions comparing the characteristics of restatement and control firms.
Briefly, we find a significant reduction in the likelihood of financial restatement
and the presence of at least one female board director.”). As always, the authors
acknowledge issues related to possible omitted variables and the direction of
causation. Id. at 626–27.
95. See id. at 611–13, 627 (“We draw upon the groupthink and group
dynamics perspectives to suggest that female board presence creates an
atmosphere in which viewpoints that may disrupt group cohesion are
communicated and considered, and the pace of decision-making is slowed.”).
96. See Douglas Cumming et al., Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572, 1573 (2015) (“Our evidence shows that gender diversity
reduces the likelihood of being in our fraud sample and reduces the severity of the
fraud.”).
97. See Iris Vermeir & Patrick Van Kenhove, Gender Differences in Double
Standards, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 281, 290 (2008) (“[W]omen are systematically less
tolerant towards unethical actions compared to men . . . .”); see also Joyce
Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblower Disclosures and Management
Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107, 113 (1999) (“Internal whistle-blowers were far more
likely to be women than men . . . .”).
98. See, e.g., Costas Hadjicharalambous & Lynn Walsh, Ethnicity/Race and
Gender Effects on Ethical Sensitivity in Four Sub-Cultures, 15 J. LEG. ETHICAL &
REG. ISSUES 119, 128 (2012) (offering an empirical analysis of ethical variations
across different racial/ethnic and gender groups).
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consumers, and communities. 99 This point benefits from empirical
support that shows that firms with more diverse boards achieve
higher corporate social responsibility ratings. 100 Diversity gives
financial firms the key to unlocking the prodigious value of an
enhanced reputation and ethicality by assuring that no important
constituency finds the firm’s conduct repellent and that the firm’s
conduct fully acclimates itself to the full spectrum of ethical
sensitivity within its operating environment. 101 Therefore, the
financial regulators should also impose more powerful
diversification standards for the purpose of insuring greater
compliance and higher ethical standards in the financial sector.

99. See Maretno Harjoto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS 641, 642 (2015) (“Firms could suffer both
monetary and reputational losses from failing to align management’s interests
with those of their stakeholders. Effective stakeholder management is a critical
requirement for firm success.”).
100.
Given that group dynamics and decision making vary depending on the
background of the individuals serving on corporate boards, a diverse
group of directors brings a different knowledge base, sets of
experiences, and perspectives on society to group decision making. As
a result, diversity increases the board’s ability to recognize the needs
and interests of different groups of stakeholders as reflected on CSR
performance.
Id.
101. See Stephen Bear et al., The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender
Composition on Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. BUS.
ETHICS 207, 207 (2010)
Corporate reputation refers to “publics’ cumulative judgment of firms
over time.” Research has demonstrated a broad range of benefits
associated with a positive reputation. A good reputation enhances a
firm’s ability to attract job applicants. Reputation affects employee
retention as employees who feel their company is well regarded by
external groups have higher job satisfaction and a lower intention to
leave their organizations. A positive reputation also enhances
corporate branding, enabling a company to use its brand equity to
launch new products and enter new markets. Reputation can positively
affect financial performance, institutional investment, and share price.
A study by Mercer Investment Consulting indicated that 46% of
institutional investors consider environmental, social, and corporate
governance when making investment decisions, and McKinsey reports
that institutional investors will pay a premium (12–14%) for wellgoverned companies.
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The true potential of ethnic and gender diversity to assure a
more stable financial sector with superior risk management
capabilities is just now beginning to emerge from the world of
social science. For example, no proponent of well-managed
diversity would advocate mere tokenism as a mechanism of
unleashing the full benefits of well-managed cultural diversity. 102
Instead, diversity management requires that diverse experiences
represent a critical mass in any group setting to allow a robust
exchange of ideas and perspectives. 103 Thus, studies regarding the
impact of a critical mass of diverse voices are just now beginning
to show how diversity in the boardroom leads to greater innovation
102. As one of us highlighted in a seminal article on diversity in business in
2000:
Many corporations, most notably Texaco, have suffered dire
consequences from an inability to manage diversity. These instances,
however, do not detract from the central thesis of this article that
businesses are using diversity as a competitive advantage in order to
maximize profits, and that the legal system should accommodate,
encourage and respond positively to this new paradigm of viewing
diversity as a strength. Instead, these instances highlight the need for
policies that assure that business organizations truly embrace
diversity rather than pursue policies of tokenism or tacit exclusion. The
point is that diversity must be properly managed.
Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 35, at 109–10.
Indeed, the concept that diversity must be embraced through policies and the
pursuit of best practices highlights the fundamental distinction between
affirmative action (which focuses on bringing traditionally excluded groups into
organizations and institutions) and diversity policies (which seek to further an
organizations institutional mission through broadening cognitive perspectives
and experiences). Id. at 109–24.
103. As Rachel Moran states:
Tokenism is the enemy of diversity. For groups previously excluded
from access to legal education, feelings of alienation and isolation not
only retard academic achievement but also silence the very voices that
are the building blocks of a diverse law school. A critical mass of these
students is necessary to achieve a truly diverse student body that
contributes to the robust exchange of ideas.
Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 208 (2006) (quoting Rachel F. Moran et
al., Statement of Faculty Policy Governing Admission to Boalt Hall and Report of
the Admissions Policy Task Force 24 (1993)). See also Marleen A. O’Connor,
Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral Dynamics of
Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 468 (2006) (suggesting that in the
absence of a critical mass of diverse directors a single diverse member is likely to
succumb to pressures to conform).
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and firm performance—and such studies focusing on critical mass
are limited by the fact that few boards include a critical mass of
women much less ethnic minorities. 104 Many prior studies of the
impact of diversity in the world of business or finance necessarily
fail to deal with the confounding effects of tokenism. 105 Ethnic and
racial diversity is so rare that virtually no empirical studies can
assess the effect of a critical mass of senior managers on financial
performance and risk management. 106
Nevertheless, insofar as the Diversity Guidelines are
concerned there can be little doubt that in light of the
above-referenced empirical evidence the regulators should proceed
more aggressively with respect to the issue of enhanced cultural
diversity in the financial sector, and fully vindicate the
Congressional intent underlying Section 342. More diverse
financial
institutions
will
curtail
risk
through
the
multi-dimensional perceptions of risk that a diverse workforce and
senior management manifestly bring to the table. 107 Further, more
diverse financial traders will lessen the propensity for financial
traders in homogenous markets to generate asset bubbles 108—
104. See Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61,
70 (2013) (“[W]e find evidence for a U-shaped link between gender diversity on
the board and firm performance . . . [a board] needs a critical mass of
women . . . to realize the advantages a more diverse board may offer. We find this
critical mass to be in the range of about 30% female representation . . . .”); see also
Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From
Tokenism to Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 312 (2011) (“[Our] results
show that the Boards’ contribution to . . . innovation is higher in boards with ‘at
least three women’: boards where women directors reach critical mass.”).
105. See Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546, 1556 (2015) (reviewing
140 studies and finding that gender diversity on boards enhances financial
performance and accounting earnings in nations that have strong investor
protections and enjoy high gender parity but that “less than a handful” of studies
measure diversity through the lens of “critical mass”).
106. See Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from
the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2011) (“[V]ery few of our texts
address the issue of a critical mass of minority (as opposed to female) directors.
In part, this reflects the simple fact that it is hard to find a public company with
three or more minority directors.”).
107. See Abbott, supra note 94, at 627 (suggesting that increased firm
diversity will inhibit or eliminate the risks of groupthink).
108. See Levine et al., supra note 83, at 18524 (explaining the correlation
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which carry huge macroprudential risks for the entire financial
sector. The financial crisis has been viewed as one of the greatest
episodes of risk mismanagement in history. 109 Diversity can
enhance sound risk management, which itself is a proven
mechanism for superior financial performance, 110 as will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV below.
III. The Increasing “Publicness” of Financial Institutions
The federal government today holds a compelling interest in
managing the risks the financial sector poses to the general
economy of the United States. 111 The financial crisis of 2007–2009
caused trillions in losses to the general economy and led to
hundreds of billions in federal bailouts. 112
This Part explains how the increasing “publicness” of financial
institutions has created the need for creative and cost-effective
solutions. Banking and financial regulation at the federal level
historically responded to major macroeconomic disruptions, such
as the Great Depression. 113 While financial institutions are
generally subject to a complex web of federal regulation, these
restrictions failed to protect the general public against the harmful
innovations that precipitated the financial crisis and led to large
macroeconomic losses. 114
between ethnic homogeneity and price bubbles).
109. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at xi–xviii (“The
nation’s largest financial institutions gorged on levels of risk—particularly in the
subprime (even predatory) mortgage business—unparalleled in U.S. financial
history.”).
110. See Vincent Aebi et al., Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and
Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3213, 3224 (2012)
(finding that banks with a more independent risk management function
outperformed other banks during the financial crisis).
111. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at xviii (“[I]n a modern
capitalist state, an economic rule of law is necessary to prevent the subversion of
capitalism arising from excessive concentrations of wealth.”).
112. Id. at xi–xviii.
113. See Ramirez, supra note 46, at 515–22 (providing broad overview and
assessment of New Deal financial regulation).
114. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 75 (“A steady
drumbeat of deregulation, nonregulation, and misregulation paced the entire
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This Part begins with an overview of the federal securities
laws that attempt to regulate the “publicness” of financial
institutions and continues by highlighting the inherent limitations
in applying these regulations to the “private” decisions of these
entities. For instance, the proliferation of innovative financial
products, which were intertwined with toxic subprime mortgages,
created pervasive negative externalities that crippled the broader
economy. 115 Yet, the existing disclosure mechanisms provided
under the federal securities laws would likely be ineffective in
preventing such negative externalities as these instruments are
often too complex to depict. The vast majority of these transactions
were also considered private and were therefore exempt from
significant regulation. 116 This Part concludes with a focused
discussion of the banking industry because many of these
institutions were deemed “too big to fail” and were thus given
massive bailout payments. 117 This deepened the adverse impact
that such institutions had on the broader economy. 118
A. Federal Regulation of “Publicness”
Financial institutions that are characterized by varying
degrees of “publicness” are subject to an intricate web of federal
regulation. 119 More specifically, when the internal “private”
decisions of financial institutions could adversely impact the
general public, the federal government subjects such institutions
causal chain of the financial crisis.”).
115. See id. at 8 (”Global financial liberalization permitted the migration [of]
toxic subprime mortgages to banks around the world. Global credit markets
ultimately collapsed under the weight of this excessive risk.”).
116. See Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?, supra note 46, at 424 (2016)
(“In passing the foundational Securities Act, Congress specifically noted that the
laws were not intended to cover transactions ‘where the public benefits are too
remote.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933))).
117. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 9.
118. See id. (discussing the government’s bailout of U.S. banks and
subsequent financial losses).
119. See Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?, supra note 46, at 422–25
(providing an in-depth discussion of how “publicness” is defined under the federal
securities laws).
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to layers of registration requirements and restrictions. 120 Banks,
for example, are subject to significant federal oversight due to the
economy’s reliance on these institutions for the creation and
transmission of capital. 121 The banking industry is therefore
strongly interconnected with other financial institutions, and a
bank failure often precipitates a financial crisis. 122 As a result,
federal banking regulations include specific capital and reserve
requirements, governance mandates, detailed licensing standards,
and several other mandates. 123 The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) also provides government-funded insurance
for all bank deposits not exceeding $250,000, 124 which helps to
“reduce systemic risk caused by a lack of confidence in the entire
banking industry during times of economic distress.” 125
In addition, financial institutions that are publicly offered to
investors, or publicly traded on an exchange, must comply with a
web of federal legislation under the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act). 126 Following the Great Depression, Congress
120. See id. at 438–39 (highlighting the Financial Stability Oversight
Council’s role in determining whether an institution’s private decisions will
impact the broader public).
121. See, e.g., João A. C. Santos, Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary
Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature, 10 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS &
INSTRUMENTS 41, 49–53 (2000) (explaining theoretical justifications for regulation
of the banking industry).
122. See generally David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market
Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015) (summarizing the market discipline
approach for regulating the banking industry).
123. See generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION (3d
ed. 2011) (summarizing and analyzing the various rules and regulations
impacting depository institutions); Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and
Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31
YALE J. REG. 565 (2014) (describing various disclosure mandates that are
generally applicable to banks).
124. Understanding Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits (last updated Apr. 26, 2016) (last visited
Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1283, 1316 (2014) [hereinafter Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract].
126. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. (last updated
June 10, 2013) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (providing a broad overview of various
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drafted these laws to resolve the unique investor protection issues
that naturally arise with the sale of securities. 127 Given that
securities are intangible instruments, investors must rely on
underlying companies to provide meaningful information
regarding their shares. 128 The unscrupulous dealings of issuers,
including their collective unwillingness to disclose accurate
information related to their offerings, led to billions of dollars of
losses for the investing public in the midst of the Great
Depression. 129
As such, Congress incorporated a mandatory disclosure
framework within the inaugural Securities Act as it requires that
issuers provide investors with material information with respect
to the initial issuance of securities. 130 Required disclosures include
detailed descriptions of the use of proceeds, a discussion of the
various management functions, an explanation of the multiple risk
factors related with the investment, audited financial statements,
and several other categories of information. 131 With the disclosure
of this information, investors are better equipped to optimize their
decisions on how to best allocate their limited capital. For the sake
of clarity, regulators do not determine the quality of a particular
offering under these laws, but rather they equip investors with the
securities laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated June 10, 2013) (last
visited Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter What We Do] (providing a broad overview of
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s history, duties, and organizational
structure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. Intangible assets and instruments have been defined as “resource[s]
which [do] not have a physical embodiment and whose industrial and economic
exploitation gives a claim to future beneﬁts.” Vittoro Chiesa et al., Determining
the Value of Intangible Assets—A Study and an Empirical Application, 5 INT’L J.
INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 123, 124 (2008).
129. See What We Do, supra note 127 (“Tempted by promises of ‘rags to riches’
transformations and easy credit, most investors gave little thought to the
systemic risk that arose from widespread abuse of margin financing and
unreliable information about the securities in which they were investing.”).
130. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j–77k (2012) (stating that the
Securities and Exchange Commission may suspend trade in a security if an
issuer’s disclosures contain false statements or omissions of material fact).
131. See id. § 77j (“Any prospectus shall contain such other information as the
Commission may by rules or regulations require as being necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
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necessary information to make such determinations on their own.
Even if investors never read these disclosures, the efficient market
hypothesis posits that publicly released information will be
automatically impounded into share prices, thereby enhancing the
reliance on such prices as a true reflection of the company’s
value. 132 Issuers who fail to disclose such material information,
either purposely or inadvertently, can be exposed to substantial
civil liabilities under various provisions of the Securities Act. 133
With respect to the Securities Act, Congress clarified that the
law is not designed to apply to regulate transactions where the
“public benefits are too remote.” 134 Although Congress failed to
provide a precise definition of the term “public,” a series of SEC
releases and Supreme Court opinions clarified that defining
“public offerings” hinges on the status of investors, as opposed to
the underlying characteristics of the corporation. 135 In particular,
when companies restrict ownership to elite investors who have the
resources to adequately protect themselves, such companies are
exempt from the arduous registration requirements under the
Securities Act. 136 The Supreme Court famously clarified the
contours of publicness in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 137 where it
held that an offering to those who can “fend for themselves” is a
transaction “not involving any public offering.” 138 The Court
reasoned that if offerees have access to the same type of
information that would be available in a registration statement,
132. See Burton G. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313,
1313 (1989) (“[The hypothesis] states that the stock market is remarkably
efficient in adjusting to, and reflecting in a rational way, all relevant information
concerning individual stocks and the economy as a whole.”).
133. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77q (2012) (detailing
penalties related to fraudulent registrations, disclosures, and interstate
transactions); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78f
(2012) (mandating that certain information must be included in registrations of
securities and prospectuses).
134. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
135. See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text (identifying a series of
regulations and Supreme Court decisions which shaped and refined the legal
concept of publicness).
136. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2016) (outlining the registration
exemptions available to investors which meet the requirements of Regulation D).
137. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
138. Id. at 125.

1824

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016)

then they do not need the protections guaranteed under the
Securities Act. 139
In 1982, the SEC provided additional guidance in constructing
private offerings when it promulgated Regulation D. 140 This safe
harbor coined a new term, “accredited investors,” which provides a
bright-line definition for investors who can properly fend for
themselves. 141 Such investors include individuals who earn over
$200,000 per year, as well as a variety of institutions, such as
banks, insurance companies, and pension plans. 142 In contrast,
issuers that offer securities to large numbers of unaccredited
investors (also known as retail investors) must register under the
federal securities laws. 143 Thus, defining “public” in the context of
the Securities Act entails evaluating characteristics of investors
for which financial institutions have a prospective or existing
contractual relationship. Assessing publicness does not extend to
the impact that such institutions have on unrelated stakeholders
such as employees, the environment, or the public at large.
While the Securities Act primarily regulates the flow of
information related to the initial issuance of securities, the
Exchange Act regulates the disclosure of information related to
securities traded on the secondary markets. 144 Broadly prohibiting
fraud in connection with the sale of securities is also an integral
component of this legislation. 145 Financial institutions that fall
139. See id. (“We agree that some employee offerings may [be exempt], e.g.,
one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the
same kind of information that the act would make available in the form of a
registration statement.”).
140. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2016) (offering registration exemptions to
those investors who meet certain requirements under Regulation D).
141. See id. § 230.501(a) (providing the definition of accredited investor).
142. Id.
143. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012) (detailing which
information is required in a registration prospectus); see also Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012) (detailing registration requirements for trading
securities on national exchanges).
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (“[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and
control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . . . .”).
145. See id. §§ 78j & 78f (providing auditing requirements and penalties
associated with violations of those requirements).
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within the definition of “public company” must comply with the
periodic disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act. 146 The
definition of public company under the Exchange Act includes the
following three categories of issuers: (1) issuers that have
securities listed on an exchange; 147 (2) issuers with “total assets”
exceeding ten million dollars and classes of equity securities held
by at least 2,000 persons (or 500 persons who are not accredited
investors); 148 and (3) any issuer that files a registration statement
under the Securities Act. 149 Financial institutions could potentially
fall under any of these categories of public company due to their
size, number of holders, and/or registration status under the
Securities Act. As a result, companies must file the periodic reports
mandated under the Exchange Act unless an available exclusion
or exemption applies to the underlying entity. 150 Thus, defining
“public” in the context of the Exchange Act largely entails
evaluating both the size and the number of investors of a particular
company. Similar to the Securities Act, assessing publicness does
not extend to the impact that such institutions have on unrelated
third parties.
B. Financial Innovation and Complexity
The rapid proliferation of complex and innovative financial
products has expanded the overall impact that certain financial
institutions have on the general public. 151 In particular, countless
146. See id. § 78m (detailing and outlining the periodic reporting
requirements imposed on issuers of securities under the Exchange Act).
147. See id. § 78l(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer
to effect any transaction in any security (other than an exempted security) on a
national securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to such security
for such exchange . . . .”).
148. See id. § 78l(g) (establishing a threshold at which a company must
register its securities).
149. See id. § 78l(f)(1)(G) (indicating when a security is the subject of an initial
public offering).
150. See id. § 78l(g) (outlining exemptions to the general periodic reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act).
151. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the
Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 234–51 (2010) (examining
the explosion in financial innovation, including money market funds, junk bonds,
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individuals, who had no prospective or existing contractual
relationship with such institutions, have suffered dire
consequences resulting from the supposedly “private” decisions of
publicly traded entities. For instance, large banking institutions
played a pivotal role in creating the instruments that precipitated
the financial crisis. 152 These institutions created and sold
innovative financial instruments such as credit default obligations
(CD”), credit default swaps “CD”), and other exotic derivatives. 153
These instruments essentially gave banks the power to repackage
and sell debt to a variety of market participants, which led to a
robust credit market that evaded significant oversight under the
federal securities laws. 154 These products initially improved the
facilitation of credit for countless individuals. 155 However, the
growth of these markets “introduce[ed] new and unregulated types
of leverage into the system . . . mak[ing] them very vulnerable to
external shocks.” 156 When the speculative bubbles associated with
these instruments inevitably burst, the resulting losses to the
general public were staggering. 157
Many of these complex transactions were considered “private
offerings” and were thus exempt from regulation under the federal
securities laws. Since banks, insurance companies, hedge funds,
mutual funds, and other institutional investors are considered
private investment funds, asset securitization, derivatives, and repurchase
agreements).
152. See Stout, supra note 3, at 19–20 (2011) (arguing that the deregulation
of OTC derivatives under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000
was a major contributor to the financial crisis).
153. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 83 (“The market for
over-the-counter derivatives soared to $595 trillion by 2007.”); see also FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 27–38 (discussing the shadow banking system
and its role in the 2008 financial crisis).
154. See id. (explaining that prior to the Dodd–Frank Act, credit derivatives
were not subject to regulatory oversight by the CFTC).
155. See Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 550 (2009) (“[T]he model enabled de facto
income to be recognized, on a statistical basis, in order to enable the poor to
borrow money and acquire homes.”).
156. Hilary Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 861, 873 (2015).
157. See id. at 873–74 (explaining the wide-reaching effects and economic
damage which can result from the vulnerability of financial innovations).
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“accredited investors,” such investors are free to trade these
instruments without providing disclosures available to the general
public. 158 In fact, these institutional investors controlled a large
portion of the CDO, CDS, and other niche markets, which have
been widely identified as being the primary culprit of the financial
crisis. 159 Over-the-counter derivatives were also specifically
exempt from state and federal regulation under the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which many have identified as
being yet an additional culprit in facilitating the financial crisis. 160
These exemptions largely contributed to the creation of the
“shadow banking” industry, 161 which refers to a network of
“financial intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of
credit across the global financial system, but whose members are
not subject to regulatory oversight.” 162 While credit was
historically created and managed by large banking institutions
subject to prudential regulation, many OTC-derivatives created a
mechanism for exempt entities to directly participate in such credit
158. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2016) (defining an “accredited investor” for the
purposes and exemptions of Regulation D).
159. See, e.g., Photis Lysandrou, The Real Role of Hedge Funds in the Crisis,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e83f9c52-6910-11e19931-00144feabdc0.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“On the eve of the crisis at
end-2006, hedge funds held about 47 per cent of the $3tn worth of CDOs while
the banks held 25 per cent and insurance companies and asset managers held the
remaining 28 per cent.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at xxiv (“The enactment
of legislation in 2000 to ban the regulation by both the federal and state
governments of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives was a key turning point in the
march toward the financial crisis.”).
161. See Karin Matussek, Hedge Funds Are Shadow Banks in Need of
Regulation, Bafin Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 13, 2012, 6:01 PM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-13/hedge-funds-are-shadowbanks-in-need-of-regulation-bafin-says (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (reporting
comments made by Germany’s financial regulator on how hedge funds act and
how they should be recognized) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). But see ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N, THE ROLE OF CREDIT HEDGE FUNDS IN THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ASSET MANAGERS, NOT SHADOW BANKS 3 (2012) (arguing that
hedge fund industry is a part of the asset management sector, as opposed to
shadow banking and that “hedge funds generally do not engage directly in credit
transformation”).
162. Shadow Banking System, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/shadow-banking-system.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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markets. 163 These troubling loopholes under federal law permitted
the exemption of such transactions from significant oversight,
without considering that they would likely create negative
externalities that would spread to the global markets. 164 Thus, the
markets that facilitated the crisis were largely opaque, which
complicated the process of deriving an appropriate regulatory
response.
Even if such transactions were subject to federal oversight, the
existing mechanisms for regulating public firms are likely
ineffective in protecting the general public from the negative
externalities discussed herein. Simply mandating the disclosure of
highly complex instruments does little to protect unrelated
stakeholders from the harms presented by such products. 165 In
fact, many highly sophisticated investors did receive disclosures
summarizing the risks of these complex instruments, but such
disclosures were inherently inadequate. 166 As one commentator
noted, “even when the institutions that develop these products
honestly disclose the inherent risks to investors: the new products
still add complexity and interconnectedness to the financial
system, increasing the amount and obscuring the allocation of risk
163. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 48–49 (describing the
deregulation of OTC markets through the 1990s and its relationship to the
financial crisis).
164.
[T]he OTC derivatives market was] unregulated and largely opaque,
with no public reporting requirements and little or no price discovery.
With the Lehman bankruptcy, participants in the market became
concerned about the exposures and creditworthiness of their
counterparties and the value of their contracts. That uncertainly
caused an abrupt retreat from the market.
See id. at 363–64.
165. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (explaining the causes behind the
insufficiency of disclosures).
166.
[M]ost, if not all, of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market
for securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, yet the
disclosure was insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks
very difficult to understand . . . a typical offering of these securities
is . . . hundreds of pages . . . .
Id. at 1110.
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in the system as a whole.” 167 Investment strategies that utilize
derivatives are often too complex to depict, as even the most
sophisticated of investors may encounter difficulties in fully
understanding the associated risks. 168 Deriving valuation
mechanisms often necessitate highly complex algorithms and
computer programs that evade human understanding. 169 Overall,
relying on such archaic disclosure mechanisms to protect investors
from these innovative products may prove to be insufficient and
will do little to mitigate future crises.
Company boards have also perpetuated a perverse culture of
shareholder primacy, which tends to embody short-term gains to
shareholder value, without providing due consideration to longterm stability. 170 This myopic focus on short-term shareholder
value can lead to excessive risk taking behavior on the part of
corporate management, which could adversely affect the long-term
interests of shareholders, as well as third-party stakeholders
(whose interests are often intertwined with the economic interests
of shareholders). 171 In effect, boards that are making a good faith
attempt to effectively manage their companies may be incentivized
“to disregard the externalities of their actions.” 172 With respect to
the financial crisis, many company boards aggressively pursued
the short-term profitability associated with riding the subprime
mortgage bubble, without appropriately considering the long-term
effects to firm stability, and to the economy at large. 173 This
phenomenon is exacerbated by the prevalent practice of

167. Allen, supra note 156, 872–73.
168. See generally Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure
Information,’ and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012).
169. See Allen, supra note 156, at 872–73 (explaining that even honest
disclosures do not erase the difficulties created by the complexity of the
instruments).
170. See id. at 885 (describing focus on short-term gain at the expense of longterm stability as part of the financial industry’s culture).
171. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
172. Allen, supra note 156, at 876.
173. See id. at 885 (describing the industry culture as lacking regard for
others, uninterested in long-term stability, and focused only on the short-term).
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compensating corporate management with company shares, 174
which can further incentivize corporate management to enhance
the short-term value of their equity within the company.
C. Public Subsidies for Private Institutions
This faulty reliance on short-term shareholder value, coupled
with the pervasive dependence on risky financial instruments,
caused several prominent financial institutions to fail towards the
end of 2008. Lehman Brothers, and several other firms filed for
bankruptcy, which crippled the global economy. 175 As noted by a
case study published by Yale School of Management, when
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman) filed for bankruptcy in
September 2008,
[N]ever before had such a large financial institution
failed—its operations, clients and counterparties spread across
the globe. Its derivative book alone consisted of more than
900,000 contracts. Lehman’s clients and counterparties
experienced direct effects from its failure and disclosed millions
of dollars of potential losses as they began to account for their
exposures, but that was only a small fraction of the impact. The
tremors from Lehman’s demise reached well beyond its direct
counterparties . . . Concern regarding its real estate assets, its
large derivative book, and its significant involvement with
collateralized debt obligations . . . soon “infected” the shadow
banking system, contributing to a retraction of wholesale
funding and a severe liquidity crisis for many firms, including
many with no direct links to Lehman. 176

174. See Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 28, at 3
(explaining that this practice encourages corporate managers to engage in risky
behavior to inflate the short-term value of the company).
175. Why
TARP
Was
Necessary,
U.S.
DEP’T
TREASURY
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/WhyTARP-was-Necessary.aspx (last updated Nov. 15, 2016, 1:34 PM) (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Andrew Metrick, The Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion, YALE SCH. MGMT. 2 (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593081 (last visited Dec. 13,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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As evidenced by this excerpt, when a systemically important
financial institution (SIFI) 177 such as Lehman, for example,
experiences solvency-threatening losses, the adverse consequences
could spread to governments, other firms, and the public at large.
Given the adverse effects of a SIFI’s failure, the Treasury
established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) “to help
stabilize the U.S. financial system, restart economic growth, and
Distressed
financial
prevent
avoidable
foreclosures.” 178
institutions that were deemed “too big to fail” were able to request
sizable subsidies from TARP, which allocated approximately $250
billion to these troubled institutions. 179 AIG alone was granted $70
billion in TARP funds in order to prevent its imminent failure. 180
Proponents of these programs reasoned that such bailouts were
necessary as the failure of these institutions would constitute
systemic risk events that would effectively decimate the global
economy. 181
Even still, the federal bailout of financial institutions was
widely criticized as taxpayers, who were excluded from the private
decision-making processes of these institutions, were forced to pay
for their mistakes. 182 Some have estimated that the Treasury has
realized billions of dollars in losses, and that the TARP program
could encourage excessive risk-taking by financial institutions
since corporate boards know that they can rely on a federal bailout
in the event of a future crisis. 183 The Congressional Oversight
177. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d) & (i) (2012) (attempting to address the risks
to stability posed by large financial companies).
178. TARP Programs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/f
inancial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. (crediting TARP with avoiding a second Great Depression).
182. See, e.g., Moira Herbst, Think the Bailout Cost US Taxpayers Nothing?
Think Again, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2013/may/28/bank-bailout-cost-taxpayers (last visited Dec. 15, 2016)
(critiquing the bailout program for costing taxpayers billions of dollars and
charging the government with painting a dishonestly rosy picture) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. See Halah Touryalai, Don’t Be Fooled, There’s No Profit in Bank Bailouts:
TARP Watchdog, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
halahtouryalai/2012/04/25/dont-be-fooled-theres-no-profit-in-bank-bailouts-tarp-

1832

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016)

Panel similarly recognized that “TARP . . . created moral hazard:
[v]ery large financial institutions may decide to take inflated risks
because they expect that, if their gamble fails, taxpayers will bear
the loss.” 184 As Professor Mehrsa Baradaran similarly noted,
In giving this aid to the large banks, the government never
explicitly demanded anything in return, and it quickly became
apparent that banks would not use these funds for publicserving purposes. Instead, they shored up their balance sheets
by saving their cash for a rainy day. Soon, the public also
learned of bonuses given to bank executives with TARP funds.
Clearly, the banking sector, which was not accustomed to
meeting public needs, rejected their intermediary function—
that it was their responsibility to take these government funds
and lend. 185

Many banks simply decided to retain TARP funds to enhance their
internal balance sheets without appropriately using such funds to
facilitate lending in the broader economy. 186
As demonstrated by these critiques, the federal bailout of
financial institutions greatly expanded the extent to which such
entities could impact the general public. Congress responded by
passing the Dodd–Frank Act as a means to implement creative and
cost-effective solutions to protect the general public from these
negative externalities. 187 With the passage of these laws, many
financial institutions will necessarily have to consider the systemic
risks of their operations, as well as the public interest in those
operations, regardless of shareholder primacy and profit
maximization.
The following Part IV continues this discussion by exploring
the contours of risk management in the financial sector and the
watchdog/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (arguing that TARP has not achieved any
kind of fundamental change to guard against a repeat of the financial crisis) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
184. TARP Provided Critical Support but Distorted Markets and Created
Public Stigma, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL (Mar. 16, 2011),
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401223120/http://cop.senate.gov
/press/releases/release-031611-final.cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, supra note 125, at 1322.
186. Id.
187. See id. (referencing the Dodd–Frank Act’s stated goal of strict oversight
of financial institutions posing a systemic risk to the economy).
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evolution of risk management theory. It examines the theory of
risk management concerns and offers examples of two recent risk
management failures. Part IV also highlights the limitations of
various solutions proposed under the Dodd–Frank Act, and builds
upon the growing body of empirical research that demonstrates
that increasing heterogeneous management is a highly effective
tool in protecting against the harms that facilitated the financial
crisis.
IV. Systemic Risk and Risk Management
Over several centuries, commercial market participants have
developed methods for addressing these types of risks.
Contemporary innovation in financial markets, however, has
altered the landscape of risk oversight in financial markets. This
Part contends that mitigating risks similarly requires greater
flexibility and creativity. Drawing on the observations in empirical
data, this Part argues that studies evaluating the benefits of
leadership diversity and diverse-group decision-making offer an
important and underexplored path toward mitigating individual
institutional risk management failures and industry-wide
systemic risk concerns.
A. Risk Regulation in Financial Markets
For almost a century, state and federal regulatory agencies
engaged in oversight of risks in financial markets. 188 Scholars and
commentators analyze regulatory oversight through a variety of
lenses. 189 While risk oversight regulation follows common
regulatory trends, a survey of affirmative legislative and
regulatory action reveals that innovation transforms markets and
leads to evolutions in our understanding of risk.
188. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1247, 1253–55 (2014) [hereinafter Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical]
(tracing the history of banking regulation since the Great Depression).
189. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘Publicness’ in
Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339
(2013) (depicting regulation as a public-private dichotomy).
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Since the Great Depression, scholars have identified five
commonly depicted periods of financial market regulation. 190 Each
of these periods offer insight into Congress’s and regulators’
earliest notions of risk—the ideas that (1) risk is local; (2) risk
relates to activities; (3) insuring against risks requires capital
buffers; (4) risk disclosures mitigate against risk; and (5) risk
modeling illuminates risk exposure. 191 Characterizing the current
period of regulatory oversight as “regulation by hypothetical,”
Mehrsa Baradaran identifies a final category of risk regulation
that entails regulation predicated on agency and market
participants’ predictions of future risk scenarios. 192 Legislative
mandates and regulatory agency actions reflect this history. 193
While evaluation of the history and development may offer a
much needed appreciation for the shifts in risk management
theory, a detailed history of risk regulation in banking is beyond
the scope of this Article. A few selected, historical reflections,
however, indicate that legislation and regulation are poised to
adapt to developments in our understanding of genuine risks to
better ensure the safety and soundness in financial markets.
Critics rightly chided regulators for their parochial
perceptions of risk and risk management across several regulatory
periods. While unit banking may have limited the systemic risk
concerns that animated much of the financial crisis, limiting
banking activity for a specific bank to a particular state or
geographic region did little to prevent banks from engaging in
excessive risk taking. All of the thoughtfulness about isolating
risks offered little solace to depositors who lost savings or homes
in the bank runs in the 1920s. Congress’s and regulators’
willingness to adapt, though admittedly at a glacial pace, has been
critical to maintain the international competitiveness of the
United States banking sector.

190. See generally Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188
(tracing the history of banking regulation since the Great Depression).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193. See id. at 1256–72 (describing various historical government measures
implementing the different regulatory regimes).
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Subsequent periods witnessed an erosion of Congressional and
regulatory reliance on disclosure of banking activities that were
limited under the National Bank Act. 194 The rise of over-thecounter derivatives provides the most prominent example of such
a change.
In the mid-1980s the Federal Reserve agreed to permit bank
affiliates to engage in securities underwriting transactions. 195 The
capital markets transactions exposed the banks to market risk,
heightening the banks’ desire to identify hedging or risk
management strategies. 196 A series of decisions by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency authorized banks to enter into and
serve as dealers in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
transactions. 197 By 1984, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
began to underscore banks boards’ obligations to manage risks by
adopting policies requiring bank boards to periodically report on
interest rate risk exposure. 198 To facilitate ingenuity in the
development of derivatives, market participants lobbied to exclude
the OTC derivatives used to hedge against risk from regulatory
oversight and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
consented. 199
In 1986, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision offered
some guidance for employing risk management techniques such as

194. See Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188, at 1261
(describing this shift in banking activities and in regulation).
195. See Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2250–51 (2014) (describing this shift in risk
management as a response to increased exposure that began in the 1980s).
196. See id. (noting that the driving force in these developments was the
increased exposure).
197. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009)
(tracing the history of derivative regulation).
198. See Interest-Rate-Risk Management; Policy Statement and Final
Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,295–96 (July 3, 1984) (establishing such reporting
requirements).
199. See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,983, 42,985 (Oct. 23, 1985) (discussing the various types of instruments that
will remain unregulated); Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54
Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 1, 1989) (providing a safe harbor from CFTC regulation for
OTC swap transactions meeting specified requirements).
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derivatives and other off-balance sheet transactions. 200 Other
regulators proposed limits for derivatives transactions, heightened
compliance policies, and internal controls. 201 The adoption of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act imposed
further internal controls. 202 Other domestic and foreign banking
regulators implemented similar permissive rules regarding risk
management oversight, attempting to temper the concerns
regarding nascent derivative products with greater internal
controls. 203
In 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
published Circular 277 and outlined the most significant sources
of risks including market, credit, liquidity, legal, and operational
risks. 204 Regulators began to ponder whether arguments in favor
of hedging—a risk management strategy—justified permitting
banks, particularly depository institutions, to act as dealers and
engage in proprietary trading in the derivatives market. The
Circular outlined three mandatory elements for all banking risk
management programs: (1) board oversight of risk management;
(2) a comprehensive risk management approach, including
detailed limits for risk taking and a system for monitoring risks;
and (3) internal and audit controls. 205
200. See Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188, at 1268
(describing the Basel framework and requirements).
201. Id.
202. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
§ 39, 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (1991) (laying out a number of novel standards and an
enforcement regime).
203. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994) (raising concerns posed by the
risks of derivatives), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154342.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) (last updated Apr. 1998) (requiring minimum
levels of capital for international banks); Supervisory Policy Statement on
Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 4,028 (Feb. 3, 1992) (updating and revising the
FFIEC’s policy on selection of securities dealers and requiring the establishment
of prudent policies for transactions).
204. Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, OFF. COMPTROLLER
CURRENCY (Oct. 1993), http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/pre1994/banking-circulars/bc-1993-277.pdf.
205. BD. GOV. FED. RES. SYS., SR 93-69 (FIS), EXAMINING RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1–3
(1993).
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Notwithstanding the march toward enhanced risk
management oversight within individual banking institutions—
described as microprudential regulation—Congress amended the
Commodities Exchange Act 206 (CEA) to supplement the CEA and
add the Commodities Futures Modernization Act. The newly
adopted legislation exempted OTC derivatives transactions from
regulatory oversight on the basis that the market participants who
engage in these transactions are sufficiently sophisticated to
manage risks related to these instruments. 207 Even though
subsequent acts by Congress emphasized internal controls within
individual firms, all of these policies failed to appreciate the
macroprudential risk management concerns burgeoning within
financial markets. The implosion within financial markets less
than a decade later firmly establishes that programs that focus
exclusively on internal risk management ignore the growing risk
management threats that reach across firms, the financial services
industry, and the territorial borders of individual national
jurisdictions.
While the Dodd–Frank Act created several mechanisms to
regulate these risk management failures, such as the
clearinghouse mandate under Title VII, 208 and increased
regulation over SIFIs, 209 these measures may be insufficient in
preventing a future financial crisis. With respect to the new
clearing requirement, parties must become a member of an
authorized clearinghouse or contract with a member of an
authorized clearinghouse in order to trade certain OTC

206. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4c(a)(1)–(2), 42 Stat.
998 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1)–(2) (2012)).
207. Responding to the Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco accounting scandals,
however, Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002, imposing greater
compliance and internal control requirements for all businesses whose securities
trade on national securities exchanges. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
208. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 728, 124 Stat. 1376, 1695–97
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323).
209. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012) (“The Council . . . may determine that a U.S.
nonbank financial company shall be supervised . . . if the Council determines that
material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company . . . could pose
a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”).
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derivatives. 210 However, this new clearing mandate could serve to
transfer and concentrate systemic risk within clearinghouse
entities. 211 With respect to the increased regulation over SIFIs, the
Dodd–Frank Act empowered a new Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) to designate a wide range of financial institutions
as SIFIs. 212 Once an institution receives this designation, it is
subject to heightened regulatory restrictions. 213 Even still, FSOC
has made relatively few SIFI designations and the likelihood of
private entities receiving such a designation (irrespective of their
abilities to increase systemic risk) has significantly declined. 214
Overall, the Dodd–Frank Act seems to have complicated and
extended the regulatory patchwork that applies to financial
institutions, without directly addressing the increasing effect that
these entities have on the general public. 215
With respect, however, to the specific issue of risk
management, Dodd–Frank did include at least two provisions that
could limit excessive risk in the financial sector without
compromising financial performance or profitability. The first is
the requirement that large and systemically important firms
210. See Governing Financial Markets, supra note 21, at 216 (explaining that
the clearinghouse requirement “mitigates risk exposure by increasing the
transparency in the industry and maximizing allocational efficiency”).
211. See id. at 226 (“The concentration of risk within clearinghouses and
among participants in the clearing industry requires careful evaluation and
monitoring.”).
212. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain
Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310) (giving guidance on which financial institutions the
Financial Stability Oversight Council may designate as a SIFI).
213. See id. at 21,653 (outlining which standards are imposed on nonbank
financial institutions).
214. Cf. Andy Winkler, Primer: FSOC’s SIFI Designation Process for Nonbank
ACTION
F.
(Sept.
3,
2014),
Financial
Companies,
AM.
http://americanactionforum.org/research/primer-fsocs-sifi-designation-processfor-nonbank-financial-companies (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting that a lack of
transparency in the SIFI designation process creates uncertainty regarding the
consequences of such a designation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
215. See Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?, supra note 46, at 434–37
(critiquing ancillary law focus under Dodd–Frank Act and advises that increasing
notions of publicness should be incorporated under primary legislation that
regulates investment fund industry).
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create enterprise wide risk management committees (and
associated protections) to modulate excessive risk. 216 Second, the
diversity initiative embodied in Section 342 also holds the promise
of enhanced financial performance as well as risk mitigation. 217 In
fact, as shown above, powerful evidence suggests that diversity
particularly leads to superior risk management during periods of
financial turbulence such as the financial crisis. 218
Part V summarizes the general mechanics of this provision.
Unfortunately, as will be further discussed below, the financial
regulators ignored this lesson and materially diluted the impact of
the statutory provision. 219 The remainder of this Article proposes
216. See Johnson & Ramirez, supra note 36, at 412–16 (examining multiple
legal and regulatory responses to failures in risk management leading up to the
2008 financial crisis).
217. See CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INST., THE CS GENDER 3000: WOMEN IN
SENIOR MANAGEMENT 3–6 (2014), https://publications.credit-suisse.com/task/
render/file/index.cfm?fileid=8128F3C0-99BC-22E6-838E2A5B1E4366DF (noting
that “greater diversity in boards and management are empirically associated with
higher returns on equity, higher price/book valuations and superior stock price
performance,” particularly during enhanced financial volatility in 2008). Of
course, causation always presents problems of proof due to the constant
possibility of omitted variables as well as the direction of causation. Id.
218. See, e.g., Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board
Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE:
AN INT’L. REV. 405, 405 (2011) (“We find that the board configurations of those
financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were significantly
different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had boards that
were busier, had less tenure and were less diverse with respect to gender.”);
Marion Hutchinson et al., Who Selects the ‘Right’ Directors? An Examination of
the Association Between Board Selection, Gender Diversity and Outcomes, 55
ACCT. & FIN. 1071, 1071 (2015) (finding that Australian companies with “greater
gender diversity moderate[d] excessive firm risk which in turn improve[d] firms’
financial performance”).
219. As one SEC Commissioner argues:
[T]he “voluntary, and let’s hope for the best” approach taken by the
Final Policy Statement is woefully inadequate and fails to meet
Congressional mandate. Thus, a good opportunity to have real positive
impact on diversity and inclusion has been squandered. As
implemented, Section 342 will be reduced to a mere exhortation to
regulated entities, many of which have not shown a commitment to
achieve diversity in their companies.
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Dissenting Statement on the Final
Interagency Policy Statement: Failing to Advance Diversity and Inclusion, SEC. &
EXCHANGE. COMMISSION (June 9, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/
dissent-interagency-policy-statement-diversity.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016)
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to reconfigure the approach the financial regulators now take to
diversity, and to give the financial sector a more forceful push
towards meritocracy—in the sense that superior risk management
through diversity may well lead to superior long run financial
performance. 220
V. Regulating Diversity
As explained in prior parts of this Article, risk governance
creates clear objectives that financial institutions can ill-afford to
ignore. Successful risk management efforts will involve the use of
a wide array of quantitative and governance tools. Board and
senior management diversity is indisputably one such tool that has
already been implemented by a number of states 221 as well as a
number of other nations. 222 To its credit, Congress heeded this
learning in adopting Section 342 of the Dodd–Frank Act. 223
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
220. We take no position on affirmative action (that is, action designed to
remedy the sordid racial history of the United States) in this paper, in the
financial sector, or elsewhere. Instead we seek simply to encourage the world of
finance to utilize all of the cognitive perspectives and experiences available to
enhance performance and financial stability. For an extended discussion of the
differences between morphological distinctions (underlying racial differences)
and cognition-based distinctions (underlying different cultural experiences), see
Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
30, 40–67 (2001) (concluding that while race does not operate as a meaningful
basis for cataloguing or understanding human genetic variation, it does operate
socially to create diverse perspectives and experiences for purposes of superior
group cognition).
221. See, e.g., S. RES. S.1007, 189th Leg. (Mass. 2015); S. RES. HR0439, 99th
Leg. (Ill. 2015); S. RES. 62, 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2013).
222. These bills seem to indicate that the United States is following European
lead in the area of increasing gender diversity. See JULIE C. SUK, DEMOCRATIC
DEFICITS & GENDER QUOTAS: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROPOSED EU DIRECTIVE ON
GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS 1 (2014), www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.
org/files/publications/Suk.pdf (noting that Norway adopted the world’s first
gender quota law in 2003, which required publicly traded companies to have no
more than sixty percent of one gender on their boards under threat of dissolution
for noncompliance). The European Union later proposed a directive in 2012 to
improve gender diversity on corporate boards. Id. at 2.
223. Section 342 generated a fair amount of controversy, even hostility, upon
its enactment. The Wall Street Journal opined that the provision would somehow
lead to political allocation of credit:
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Section 342 under the Dodd–Frank Act encourages greater
diversity in the financial services industry. 224 This Part provides a
succinct description of the mechanics of Section 342, which
generally obligates a number of federal agencies to create Offices
of Minority and Women Inclusion. 225 Such offices are charged with
ensuring the fair inclusion and utilization of minorities and women
in all business and activities of their respective agencies. 226 This
Part highlights the more controversial aspect of Section 342, which
further instructs these offices to create diversity standards for
assessing the policies of its regulated entities. 227 These standards
were finalized in June 2015. 228 However, compliance with such
standards is purely voluntary, and federal agencies have permitted
its regulated agencies to engage a self-assessment in determining
The law says this diversity czar will “ensure equal employment
opportunity and the racial, ethnic and gender diversity” of the work
force and senior management of these institutions. More ominously,
this creature of Congress and the White House will also be charged
with “increas[ing] the participation of minority-owned and
women-owned businesses in the programs and contracts” of each
agency and conducting “an assessment” of stated inclusion goals. Mull
over that one for a minute. Having recently lived through a financial
mania and panic caused in part by political pressure for “affordable
housing,” Congress will now order regulators to allocate credit by race
and gender. Isn't the point of this financial reform supposed to be to
make regulators better judges of systemic risks, which means focusing
on financial safety and soundness? If the Waters provision passes,
federal regulators will have to put racial and gender lending at the top
of their watch list when they do their checks on the banks and hedge
funds they are regulating.
Politicizing the Fed, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240
52748704575304575297130299281828 (last updated June 14, 2010) (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This opinion
ignores that Section 342 specifically forbids any mandate regarding “lending
policies and practices of any regulated entity.” Dodd–Frank Act §342(b)(4).
Indeed, standing alone, the assessment of diversity policies cannot “require any
specific action” based solely on the findings of the assessment. Id.
224. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 342, 124 Stat. 1376, 1541–
45 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012)) (listing the relevant agencies
expected to comply with Section 342).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. (outlining affirmative steps agencies shall take to seek diversity
in workforce).
228. Id.
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the adequacy of such compliance, which seems contrary to the
intent of Section 342. 229
As will be further discussed below, the financial agencies
failed in the implementation of Section 342 as the financial
regulators adopted a weak interpretation of the Congressional
mandate, which undermined Congressional efforts to ensure
macroeconomic stability as well as sound macroprudential
regulation.
A. Mechanics of Section 342
Several concerns inspired Congress to include Section 342, the
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion 230 in the Dodd–Frank
Act. 231 One concern was the manifest underrepresentation of
minorities and women in the financial services industry 232 and in
government financial service agencies, 233 as well as the lack of
229. Indeed, the architects of Section 342 in Congress issued a letter to the
financial regulators specifically highlighting their intent to impose diversity
mandates upon regulated entities consistent with the thesis of this Article. See
Honorable Maxine Waters et al., Letter to Participating Financial Agencies, April
14, 2014, http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/signed_copy
_of_letter_-_section_342.pdf. When the final guidelines were released Rep.
Waters and Rep. Beatty released a statement expressing disappointment that
“almost five years after the Dodd–Frank Act was enacted, our federal financial
services agencies continue to provide lip service to important issues related to the
diversity and inclusion of women and minorities in the financial services sector.”
See Leading Democrats Express Concerns with Agency Diversity Standards, U.S.
HOUSE
COMM.
ON
FIN.
SERVS.
DEMOCRATS
(June
18,
2015)
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docume
ntID=399208 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
230. 12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012).
231. Dodd–Frank Act § 342.
232. See 156 Cong. Rec. E1262-02 (daily ed. July 1, 2010) (speech of Hon.
Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas) (“In addition, the bill requires expanded efforts to
recruit and to retain minority and women financial services professionals,
traditionally excluded from the upper ranks of management in most of the federal
financial services regulatory entities.”).
233. See Minorities and Women in Financial Regulatory Reform: The Need for
Increasing Participation and Opportunities for Qualified Persons and Businesses:
The Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, and the
Subcomm. on Hous. & Housing & Cmty. Opportunity, of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm.,
111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm.
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employment and contracting opportunities available to women and
minorities. 234 Research demonstrates that women represented
only twenty-seven percent of senior executive managerial positions
and minorities represented only ten percent of those positions. 235
At the time of the passage of this act, only two of the twentyfive largest banks in America were headed by minorities and none
by a woman, and only between four and five percent of all 8,000 or
so American FDIC-insured banks were controlled by women and
minorities. 236 Though financial institutions had often implemented
diversity initiatives for fifteen years leading up to the passage of
this act, management diversity at these institutions had
“improved, but not changed substantially.” 237 Among the concerns
were that excluding diverse senior-level executives from making
important decisions, especially in cases of emergency, led to
excluding or not addressing challenges that minority- and womenowned businesses faced 238 and led to not prioritizing diversity. 239
on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111hhrg58045/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58045.pdf [hereinafter The Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform Joint Hearing] (citing data from multiple government financial
services agencies showing single digit percentages of women and minority
employees).
234. See id. (“In addition, minority- and women-owned businesses frequently
find themselves excluded from contracting opportunities with financial services
agencies.”).
235. See id. at 4–5 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial
Markets and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office) (noting
that older statistical categories overstated the representation of women and
minority representation in upper management); Overall Trends in Mgmt.-Level
Diversity & Diversity Initiatives, 1993-2008, UNITED STATES GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 10 (May 12, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d107
36t.pdf (breaking down representation by minority groups).
236. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at
18–19 (statement of Carlos Loumiet).
237. Id. at 5 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial Markets
and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office).
238. See id. at 3–4 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on
Housing & Community Opportunity) (“These offices would ensure that whether
it is an emergency or if it is simply the day-to-day business of the agency, a senior
level person charged with diversity will be . . . able to inform the agency about the
impact of their decisions . . . .”).
239. See id. at 29 (statement of Al Green, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty.
Opportunity) (questioning witnesses on the lack of diversity-focused efforts by
upper management officials).
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Additionally, lack of diversity at the senior executive level
minimized access for women and minorities 240 and correlated with
less managerial accountability. 241 The executive director of the
National Association of Securities Professionals, Orim Graves,
testified at a Congressional hearing before this act was passed
stating that “it is absolutely vital for the future economic and
political stability of our nation that the investment decisions are
made by a more diverse group than the one that created the
economic crisis today and in the 1980s.” 242
Section 342 requires nine federal financial services agencies
(the “Agencies”) 243 to establish an Office of Minority and Women
Inclusion (the “Offices”) for the purpose of implementing
“standards and procedures to ensure, to the maximum extent
possible, the fair inclusion and utilization of minorities, women,
and minority-owned and women-owned businesses in all business
and activities of the agency at all levels, including in procurement,
insurance, and all types of contracts.” 244 These Offices were
intended to ensure that a diverse senior-level executive would be
240. See id. at 3 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on
Housing & Community Opportunity) (commenting that minority and women
owner businesses are often excluded from contracting opportunities).
241. See id. at 8 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial
Markets and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office)
(advocating for measurement of diversity efforts in businesses as a means of
holding managers accountable for diversity performance); SIFMA, 2007 REPORT
ON U.S. WORKFORCE DIVERSITY & ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES 5–6 (2007),
https://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/for_members/hr_and_diversity_resources/fo
r%20members_hr%20and%20diversity%20resources_2007%20diversity%20surv
ey,%20executive%20report.pdf (providing an overview of data collected from
survey).
242. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at 5
(testimony of Orim Graves).
243. See Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion Created Under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked
Questions, DEP’T TREASURY (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/
Documents/FAQs%20-%20Offices%20of%20Minority%20and%20Women%20Incl
usion%20-%20Oct%202010%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he Departmental Offices of the
Department of Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency . . . the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Board, the
National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and . . . Consumer Finance Protection Bureau . . . .”).
244. 156 Congress. Rec. § 5902, 5908 (July 15, 2010).
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in the room for daily business decisions as well as decisions in an
emergency situation who could “inform the [A]gency about the
impact of their decisions on minority- and women-owned
businesses.” 245 These Offices were also intended to be responsible
for increasing diversity within the Agencies 246 by developing and
implementing workforce diversity standards. 247 The Offices would
be in charge of “all matters of its agency related to diversity in
management, employment, and business activities.” 248 In short,
these Offices were meant to ensure that diverse members sit at the
decision-making table to protect the interests of women and
minorities, 249 and that “capable, competent, and qualified” women
and minorities had equal opportunity to be at the top. 250
B. Diversity Standards for Regulated Entities
In effectuating the broad goals of the Section 342, each Agency
must appoint a director (the “Directors”) to oversee the
245. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at 4
(statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty).
246. See id. at 3–4 (reiterating the importance of institutionalizing access for
women and minority groups through these offices).
247. See, Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion Created Under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked
Questions, DEP’T TREASURY (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
wsr/Documents/FAQs%20-%20Offices%20of%20Minority%20and%20Women%20
Inclusion%20-%20Oct%202010%20FINAL.pdf (outlining other key duties of each
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion).
248. Id.
249. See The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233,
at 8 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty.
Opportunity) (“[S]o there is someone who is sitting at the table who can say . . . do
you not remember that we just had a subprime meltdown where minority
communities were targeted . . . .”).
250. See id. at 10 (statement of Al Green, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty.
Opportunity); About the Office of Minority & Women Inclusion, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (June 11, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/omwi/about-omwi (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (stating the SEC’s OMWI “is currently engaged in forming strategic
collaborations and conducting outreach to diverse professional associations,
organizations, and institutions” and “is proactively increasing awareness of the
SEC’s contracting needs by conducting outreach and providing technical
assistance to expand opportunities to minority-owned and women-owned
businesses”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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development of standards which broadly encompass: (A) “[an]
equal employment opportunity and the racial, ethnic, and gender
diversity of the workforce and senior management of the agency;
(B) increased participation of minority-owned and women-owned
business in the programs and contracts of the agency[;] . . . and
(C) assessing the diversity policies and practices of entities
regulated by the agency.”251 Thus, in addition to developing
standards intended to enhance diversity within their respective
Agencies, Directors must also develop standards to assess the
diversity policies of their regulated entities. 252 This section
represents a broad commitment to enhanced diversity in the
American economy. Arguably, with respect to the SEC for example,
the agency must develop uniform standards for assessing the
diversity policies of the thousands of public companies for which it
regulates. 253 Some have estimated that the SEC regulates over
“12,000 public companies, 5,500 broker-dealer firms, 670,000
stockbrokers, 4,600 mutual funds and 11,000-plus registered
investment advisers.” 254
1. Joint Standards
In an effort to promote consistency, six of the nine Agencies
adopted joint proposed standards on October 25, 2013, which were
to be used by the Agencies’ regulated entities to assess the
effectiveness of their respective diversity policies. 255 On June 10,
251. 15 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
252. See id. at 5452(d) (stating the extent of the section’s applicability to
contracts of an agency).
253. Cf. id. at 5452(b)(3) (“Each Director shall advise the agency
administrator of the impact of the policies and regulations of the agency on
minority-owned and women-owned businesses.”).
254. Quentin Fottrell, 10 Things the SEC Won't Tell You, MARKETWATCH
(Oct. 30, 2011, 7:02 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-the-secwont-tell-you-1320000352729 (last updated Nov. 29, 2012) (last visited Dec. 13,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See Proposed Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint
Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated
by the Agencies and Request for Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,052 (proposed
Oct. 25, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_final-diversitystandards-statement.pdf (giving background on the development of joint
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2015, the Agencies then adopted a final interagency policy
statement, which finalized these joint diversity standards (Joint
Standards). 256 These Joint Standards address the following
categories of activities with respect to such regulated entities:
(1) organizational commitment to diversity and inclusion;
(2) workforce profile and employment practices; (3) procurement
and business practices and supplier diversity; and (4) practices to
promote transparency of organizational diversity and inclusion. 257
Under each of these categories, the Agencies then provide specific
standards that regulated entities can evaluate in assessing the
suitability of their diversity policies. 258 The Agencies further
specify that each of these standards could be tailored to the unique
characteristics of each regulated entity such as size, number of
employees, and total assets under management. 259
Overall, these Joint Standards imply that diversity
assessments should extend beyond the boardroom to include senior
management, employees, and contractual relationships with
suppliers and other possible sub-contractors. 260 With respect to
supplier diversity for example, the Agencies suggest that firms
attempt to provide “a fair opportunity for minority-and womenowned business to compete for procurement of business goods and
services . . . .” 261 With regard to enhancing workforce diversity, the
Agencies suggest that regulated entities recruit from institutions
that serve large female or minority populations, such as
Historically Black Colleges and Universities. 262
standards and seeking comment on their perceived effectiveness).
256. Joint Guidelines, supra note 44.
257. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,055–56 (providing summaries of the
applicability of each category of standards).
258. See id. (“The Entity provides regular progress reports to the board and/or
senior management.”).
259. See id. at 64,055 (“For example . . . governance structure,
revenues, . . . contract
volume,
geographic
location,
and
community
characteristics . . . .”).
260. See id. (setting out standards that apply to both low-level employees and
upper management).
261. 80 Fed. Reg. 33017.
262. Cf. OFFICE OF MINORITY AND WOMEN INCLUSION, FDIC, 2012 REPORT TO
CONGRESS 12 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/about/diversity/rtc_3_28_13.pdf (“[T]he
FDIC’s Corporate Recruitment Program continued in 2012 to maintain ongoing
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However, this Article primarily evaluates the implementation
of diversity standards related to management, which is the first
category identified by the Agencies. Senior management would
likely include the board members of a regulated entity, as well as
its senior officers such as the CEO and CFO, for example. With
respect to this first category, the Agencies suggest that regulated
entities implement the following standard (among others): “[t]he
entity takes proactive steps to promote a diverse pool of
candidates, including women and minorities, in its hiring,
recruiting, retention, and promotion, as well as in its selection of
board members, senior management, and other senior leadership
positions.” 263 This standard is likely designed to ensure that a
diverse pool of candidates is considered for the leadership roles of
regulated entities.
The Joint Standards also provide that the term “diversity”
specifically encompasses minorities and women, with “minorities”
including “Black Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic
Americans, and Asian Americans.” 264 However, the Joint
Standards permit regulated entities to use a more expansive
definition. 265 An expanded definition of diversity could possibly
include “individuals with disabilities, veterans, and LGBT
individuals.” 266
2. Voluntariness
In adopting these Joint Standards, the Agencies clarified that
assessing the diversity policies of regulated entities would not
entail a traditional examination or supervision process. 267 More
relationships with a wide range of colleges and universities to target a diverse
talent pool for the CEP. These colleges and universities included 110 institutions
designated as either minority-serving institutions or tribal colleges.”).
263. 78 Fed. Reg. 64052, 64055.
264. 80 Fed. Reg. 33017.
265. See id. (“This language is intended to be sufficiently flexible to
encompass other groups . . .”).
266. Id.
267. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,054 (noting that many different types of
assessments allow for both the Agencies and the public to understand diversity
policies).
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specifically, the Agencies seemingly will not employ their
enforcement powers to ensure that their regulated entities are in
compliance with the statute. Regulated entities are instead
instructed to implement a self-assessment of their diversity
policies, using the guidance provided under the Joint Standards. 268
While compliance with these Joint Standards is highly encouraged
by the Agencies, it is still purely voluntary. Regulated entities will
seemingly not face enforcement proceedings for failing to integrate
these Joint Standards within their underlying policies and
practices. 269 Disclosure of such compliance (or non-compliance) has
also been deemed voluntary by the Agencies. 270 While the Joint
Standards strongly encourage transparency—through the annual
publication of diversity policies on company websites, for
example—the Joint Standards clarified that such disclosure, both
to the general public and to their respective Agencies, is completely
voluntary. 271
Many commenters appreciated the Agencies’ decision to
permit self-assessments. One comment letter published by several
banking associations stated that “[r]egulated entities themselves
are in the best position to assess their own diversity policies and
practices. Many larger regulated entities already have well
considered diversity policies and a track record of implementing,
applying and developing those policies in the real world.” 272 In
contrast, other commenters expressed concerns that permitting
268. See id. (suggesting that the use of self-assessment promotes
transparency and awareness within the entities).
269. See 80 Fed. Reg. 33,017 (“[T]he Agencies have added the following
language: ‘This document is a general statement of policy . . . . It does not create
new legal obligations.’”).
270. See 80 Fed. Reg. 33,020 (recounting that other commenters who claim
that voluntary disclosure would conflict with congressional intent).
271. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,056 (stating that Agencies will use the
disclosed information as resource in carrying out diversity efforts).
272. Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from the
Consumer
Bankers
Ass’n,
et
al.,
3
(Feb.
6,
2014),
http://consumerbankers.com/sites/default/files/2014-02-06%20Joint%20Trades%
20Letter%20Re%20Proposed%20Interagency%20Standards%20for%20Assessing
%20Diversity%20Policies%20%28OMWI%29.pdf.
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self-assessment would significantly detract from the stated goals
of the act. 273
SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar strongly objected that in
permitting self-assessments, the Agencies ignored the vast
majority of comment letters received from “[m]embers of Congress,
civil rights organizations, community-based organizations,
professional associations, consumer advocacy groups, banking
organizations, employer associations, financial services trade
organizations, banks, credit unions, and individuals.” 274 According
to Commissioner Aguilar, these commenters persuasively argued
that “voluntary self-assessments are ineffective because, without
specific obligations and requirements, few regulated entities will
conduct assessments or share assessment information.” 275 If this
is true, then Section 342 will have a minimal impact on actually
increasing diversity in the financial sector. Americans for
Financial Reform further suggested that Agency Offices should
“devote staff and develop methodologies to conduct assessments of
the entities that they regulate.” 276
With respect to the voluntary disclosure of such diversity
policies, commentators similarly expressed concerns regarding the
extent to which this would hold regulated entities sufficiently
accountable. Professor Cheryl Nichols suggests that Congress
intended that the disclosure of diversity policies by regulated
273. See Leading Democrats Express Concerns with Agency Diversity
Standards, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVS. DEMOCRATS (June 18, 2015),
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docume
ntID=399208 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“[T]hese final rules . . . have the
potential to undermine the meaningful progress Dodd–Frank made toward a
more diverse financial sector.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
274. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting
Statement on the Final Interagency Policy Statement: Failing to Advance
9,
2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/
Diversity
and
Inclusion (June
statement/dissent-interagency-policy-statement-diversity.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
275. Id.
276. Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from the
Americans for Financial Reform, 3 (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/
CommentLetters/CLExtension20140207AFR.pdf.
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entities be mandatory. 277 Nichols concludes that mandatory
disclosure is necessary as it would provide the data needed to
ascertain the efficacy of the statute. 278
VI. Safety & Soundness and Diversifying to Mitigate Risk
As Part IV explained, Congress intended for Section 342 to
reach businesses in the financial services sector whether organized
as corporations that have distributed shares in public securities
markets or limited liability companies or partnerships engaged in
the shadow banking market intermediating credit. The Joint
Standards encompass the weak standards that federal regulatory
agencies have adopted to date. Regulators have power to reduce
excessive risk taking and broad powers to order remedies
concerning risk-taking innovation. 279 Financial regulators hold
broad power to determine legal violations in the financial sector. 280
This Article suggests that financial regulators exercise these
powers to further the full diversification of the financial sector in
appropriate circumstances. 281 We will begin our assessment of the
regulatory powers the federal financial regulators wield in the
banking industry and then discuss the even broader powers the
SEC holds to facilitate diversity.

277. See Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from Cheryl
Nichols 2 (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-13/s70813-21.pdf
(“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily considered mandatory . . . .”).
278. See id. (arguing that such data will be essential to determine whether
more regulation is needed).
279. See generally MARY RAMIREZ & STEVEN RAMIREZ, THE CORPORATE DEATH
PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 1–28 (2017)
(analyzing the ability of politically and economically high-powered figured to
commit financial crimes with no regulatory or criminal repercussions).
280. See id. (noting that, despite overwhelming proof of fraud during the 2008
financial crisis, the government failed to utilize its law enforcement tools).
281. We fully comprehend the complex political realities facing the financial
regulators. The revolving door problem, lobby largesse, campaign contributions,
and overlapping social networks are all beyond the scope of this Article. Id.
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A. The Federal Banking Regulators

The starting point for understanding the powers of the federal
bank regulators 282 is the concept of safe and sound banking
practices: the banking regulators assure the safety and soundness
of banks by sanctioning unsafe and unsound banking practices
uncovered, inter alia, during annual examinations. 283 Since 1933,
this bedrock principle of banking regulation has acted as the
trigger of the federal banking regulators vast enforcement
282. Only the OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed share enforcement powers as
direct regulators of banks and similar depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1813
(q), (z) (2012). The NCUA holds similar power with respect to federal credit
unions. 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (2012). The Fed also exercises enforcement power
against bank holding companies and non-bank subsidiaries under Section 1818.
12 U.S.C. § 1818 (b)(3) (2012). As used in this Article, the term “federal bank
regulators” refers to these agencies. These regulators typical conduct annual bank
examinations and evaluate the safety and soundness of each regulated bank.
Julie Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution
Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1107
(2015)
During an examination, regulators . . . review the institution’s policies,
procedures, and records. Examiners then rate the institution using the
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System. Under the System,
regulators evaluate the safety and soundness of institutions using the
“CAMEL” or “CAMELS” factors: capital, assets, management,
earnings, liquidity, and susceptibility to market risk. Regulators rate
each item on a 1 to 5 scale, with a 1 rating being the highest possible
score.” Examiners also award each institution a composite rating
meant to assess the overall condition of the institution. The composite
score is not simply an average of the component ratings. Rather, in
issuing a composite rating the regulator considers the components and
“may incorporate any factor that bears significantly on the
[institution's] overall condition.”
Id. We argue herein that the degree of cultural diversity within a financial
institution should be one factor that regulators consider in addressing the safety
and soundness of a financial institution.
283. Principles of safety and soundness form the foundation of federal bank
regulation. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin:
Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 144, 165, 178 (1995) (“Unsafe or unsound banking practices long have
served as a trigger for . . . liability under every important formal enforcement
provision in the federal banking laws.”). Under these provisions bank regulators
can: issue cease and desist orders, including monetary damages; remove directors
and officers from office; prohibit firms from participation in the banking industry;
and impose fines of up to one million dollars per day. Id.
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powers. 284 Although mentioned in many key banking law statutes,
at the federal level, the term “unsafe and unsound banking
practice” 285 has been defined primarily through regulatory
statements and actions. 286 Most recently, the OCC defined the
term in an enforcement action as “any action, or lack of action,
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would
be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its
shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance
funds.” 287 The federal banking regulators rely on this definition
when exercising the broad enforcement powers that Congress gave
them. 288 Notably, none of those statutes requires more. 289
Thus, under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, the bank regulators may
exercise broad powers to deal with any bank that engages in unsafe
and unsound banking practices. 290 The FDIC, for example, can
284. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818, 1844 (2012) (specifying the enforcement
tools and powers of the NCUA, the OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed).
285. In re Adams, No. AA-EC-11-50, 2014 WL 8735096, at *2 (Sept. 30, 2014).
286. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the Federal Deposit Insurance Act contains
no definition of the term “unsafe or unsound practice” and asserting John E.
Horne’s definition is the primary definition used in enforcement actions).
287. Id. at *2–3 (citing Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966:
Hearings on S. 3158 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 49 (1966) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman of the Fed. Home Loan
Bank Bd.)); see also Nw. Nat’l Bank v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 917 F.2d 1111,
1115 (8th Cir. 1990) (defining the term “unsafe or unsound business practice” as
“conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking operations which
might result in abnormal risk or loss to a banking institution or shareholder”)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th
Cir. 1978)).
288. See id. at *3 (“The OCC and the other Federal banking agencies
consistently have relied on this definition in bringing enforcement cases in the
decades since [Horne’s description of the term].”); see also id. (“[A] minority of
circuits apply the [Horne] definition with a restrictive gloss that serves to narrow
the circumstances under which enforcement actions may be taken.”) (citing Gulf
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir.
1981) (referring to an additional requirement that the practice threaten the
financial stability of the bank)).
289. Professor Schooner suggests that the unsafe and unsound practice must
also involve “at least a potential risk to the bank’s solvency.” Schooner, supra note
283, at 202.
290. The plain meaning of the statute fails to require any threat to the
financial stability of the bank. See, e.g., In re Adams, 2014 WL 8735096, at *3–4

1854

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016)

terminate the deposit insurance of any insured depository
institution for “engaging in any unsafe and unsound practices” or
operating in an “unsafe and unsound condition.” 291 In addition, all
federal bank regulators can issue cease and desist orders to any
federally regulated bank to stop any “unsafe or unsound
practice.” 292 The agencies can remove any officer or director of a
regulated entity if it finds that any officer or director “participated
in any unsafe or unsound practice . . . .” 293 The federal banking
regulators can also force an insured bank into conservatorship or
receivership for unsafe or unsound practices, or for operating in an
unsafe or unsound condition. 294 Finally, the agencies can seek civil
penalties for unsafe and unsound practices of up to one million
dollars per day. 295
(describing the range of possible remedies enforcement staff may take against
banks). It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the decisions that narrow the
regulatory reach of the enforcement power of the federal bank regulators with the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. See generally
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Section 1831o of title 12 of the United States Code requires the federal
banking regulators to take “prompt corrective action” even against wellcapitalized depository institutions when the regulators find unsafe or unsound
practices. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(2) (2012) (requiring each appropriate federal
banking agency take “prompt corrective action” to resolve problems). “With the
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
Congress directed the federal banking agencies to exercise their enforcement
muscle long before an institution fails or faces imminent threat of failure.”
Schooner, supra note 283, at 178. This forces the regulators to assume a more
formal and proactive role with regard to supervision of operating institutions. Id.
291. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (a)(2) (2012).
292. See id. § 1818(b) (describing the cease and desist proceeding).
293. See id. § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) (allowing for the removal of officers of a
regulated entity when the entity is found to have “engaged or participated in any
unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any insured depository institution
or business institution”). Any such prohibition amounts to an industry-wide
prohibition. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7) (2012) (requiring an “industrywide
prohibition” on the hiring of removed or suspended individuals). Thus, this power
can operate to terminate careers. See id. at § 1818(g) (providing authority for
suspension, removal, and prohibition of participation orders for certain criminal
offenses).
294. See id. § 1821(c)(5) (describing the grounds for appointing a conservator
or receiver).
295. See id. § 1833(b)(2) (allowing an agency to assess civil penalties for
continuing violations in an amount “[not to] exceed the lesser of $1,000,000 per
day or $5,000,000”).
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In the course of enforcing these broad powers to assure safe
and sound banking, the banking regulators can restrict the growth
of an institution, place limitations on the activities of an
institution, or, importantly, “employ qualified officers or
employees” subject to the approval of the banking regulators. 296
Indeed, Congress specified that the federal banking regulators
may “take such other actions as the banking agency determines to
be appropriate.” 297 Further, Congress statutorily recognized that
the federal banking regulators may come to negotiated agreements
with the banks they supervise, and violation of such agreements
themselves trigger the above-referenced enforcement powers. 298
Finally, the federal banking regulators may deem a bank to be
engaged in an unsafe and unsound banking practice if a bank
receives an unsatisfactory rating in an examination report for
asset quality, management, earnings, or liquidity. 299
Congress gave the federal banking regulators additional
regulatory power over virtually all core facets of banks. 300 Under
12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1, the federal banking regulators must
promulgate standards for safe and sound internal controls, loan
documentation and underwriting, interest rate risk, asset growth,
compensation, and other managerial standards. 301 If any bank
fails to meet such standards, then the federal banking regulator
may seek a remedial plan, acceptable to the regulator. 302 If such a
plan is not forthcoming, the relevant federal banking regulator

296. See id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)–(F) (listing the affirmative actions banking
regulators may take to correct conditions resulting from violations or practices).
297. Id. § 1818(b)(6)(F).
298. See id. § 1818(a)(2)(iii), (b)(1) & (e)(1)(A)(i)(III)–(IV) (establishing a
violation of a written agreement as cause for exercise of enforcement power).
299. See id. § 1818(b)(8) (providing that bank regulators may deem an
institution to be “engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice” the institution is
found to have unsatisfactory asset quality, management, earnings, or liquidity).
300. See id. § 1831p-1(a)(1)–(2) (listing each internal bank practice for which
bank regulators may prescribe standards).
301. See id. § 1831p-1(a) (enumerating the operational and managerial
standards federal banking agencies must enforce).
302. See id. § 1831p-1(e)(1)(A)(i) (explaining how if the failure to meet safety
and soundness standards involves a violation of a regulation the federal banking
regulator “shall” seek a corrective plan).
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may order the bank to take “any other action” 303 necessary for the
prompt correction of the deficiency. 304
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed) holds
additional powers with respect to bank holding companies.
Specifically, under 12 U.S.C. § 1844, the Fed may order the
termination of any activity or the divestiture of any subsidiary
constituting a “serious risk” to the “financial safety soundness and
stability” of the bank holding company or subsidiary bank. 305 The
bank holding company may either terminate the activity that is
the source of the risk, terminate its ownership of the non-bank
subsidiary where the risk resides, or terminate ownership of its
bank subsidiary. 306 Termination of ownership may be
accomplished through sale or distribution of shares to
shareholders of the bank holding company. 307
Of course, the federal banking regulators need not exercise
these powers in order to impose reforms if enforcement targets
agree to proposed governance reforms. For example, the Fed
recently sanctioned State Street Bank (a state-chartered member
bank of the Federal Reserve System) and its parent company State
Street Corporation (a bank holding company). 308 The Fed
303. Id. § 1831p-1(e)(2)(B)(iv).
304. Section 1831o requires that “[e]ach appropriate Federal banking agency
and the Corporation (acting in the Corporation’s capacity as the insurer of
depository institutions under this chapter) shall carry out the purpose of this
section by taking prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured
depository institutions.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831o.
305. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (allowing the Fed, “whenever it has reasonable
cause to believe that the continuation by a bank holding company of any
activity . . . constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or
stability of a bank holding company subsidiary bank,” to terminate the activities).
306. See id. § 1844(e)(1)(A)–(B) (reviewing the powers of the Fed to terminate
activities, ownership, and control of nonbank subsidiaries).
307. See id. (explaining that the Fed may order the termination of ownership
which may occur “by sale or by distribution of the shares of the subsidiary to the
shareholders of the bank holding company”).
308. See Written Agreement by and among, State Street Corporation, Boston,
Massachusetts, State Street Bank and Trust, Boston, Massachusetts, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, and Massachusetts Division of Banks, before the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, May 28, 2015, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20150601a1.pdf (describing the technicalities
of the alleged noncompliance).
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enforcement action culminated in an agreement that required
State Street Corporation to, among other things: (1) submit a
written plan to strengthen the board’s oversight of compliance and
risk management acceptable to the regulators with respect to
money laundering and compliance with the U.S. Treasury Office of
Foreign Asset Control; (2) address funding for personnel, systems,
and other resources as needed to achieve appropriate risk
management and compliance; (3) take measures to improve the
information reported to the board of directors with respect to such
compliance; (4) ensure greater senior management participation in
such compliance efforts; and (5) provide for enhanced monitoring
and testing of compliance with respect to such regulatory
mandates. 309 State Street Bank also agreed to such enhanced
measures to achieve compliance with regulations. 310 Additionally,
the bank agreed to hire an independent third party to conduct a
compliance review. 311 Essentially, “State Street Corp. was ordered
by regulators to revamp its compliance programs after deficiencies
were found related to internal controls, customer due-diligence
procedures and transaction monitoring.” 312 This agreed method of
resolving regulatory deficiencies illustrates well the wide-ranging
powers of the federal banking regulators to impose reforms in
internal governance at regulated entities. 313
309. See id. at 1–3 (describing the mandated requirements for board oversight
and a compliance risk management program).
310. See id. 1–2 (detailing the bank’s commitment to bring operations into
compliance with multiple different regulations).
311. See id. at 7 (“Within 30 days of this Agreement, the Bank shall engage
an independent third party, acceptable to the Supervisors, to conduct a review of
account and transaction activity . . . .”).
312. Chelsey Dulaney & Ryan Tracy, State Street Ordered to Improve
Compliance Program, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/state-street-ordered-to-improve-compliance-program-1433174224 (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
313. In another such example, the OCC fined HSBC $500 million and ordered
it “to take comprehensive corrective actions to improve its BSA compliance
program.” OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). On the same date, the OCC
“issued a separate cease and desist order to address deficiencies in the bank's
enterprise-wide compliance program.” Id. HSBC consented to both orders. Id.
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The banking regulators also have the power to issue
interpretive guidance to regulated entities. The FDIC—holding
broad regulatory power due to its role as deposit insurer—issued
such guidance regarding its expectations of officers and directors
of FDIC insured banks. 314 The FDIC expects directors to maintain
“competent management,” to “establish[] business strategies and
policies,” and to take actions to assure legal compliance and
compliance with principles of safety and soundness. 315 Officers are
“responsible for compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and
principles of safety and soundness.” 316 Moreover, the FDIC expects
managers “to respond promptly to supervisory criticism.” 317 “When
an institution becomes troubled, it is especially important that it
have the benefit of the advice and direction of people whose
314. The FDIC statement regarding fiduciary duties of officers and directors
provides:
The duty of care requires directors and officers to act as prudent and
diligent business persons in conducting the affairs of the bank. This
means that directors are responsible for selecting, monitoring, and
evaluating competent management; establishing business strategies
and policies; monitoring and assessing the progress of business
operations; establishing and monitoring adherence to policies and
procedures required by statute, regulation, and principles of safety and
soundness; and for making business decisions on the basis of fully
informed and meaningful deliberation. Officers are responsible for
running the day to day operations of the institution in compliance with
applicable laws, rules, regulations and the principles of safety and
soundness. This responsibility includes implementing appropriate
policies and business objectives. Directors must require and
management must provide the directors with timely and ample
information to discharge board responsibilities. Directors also are
responsible for requiring management to respond promptly to
supervisory criticism. Open and honest communication between the
board and management of the bank and the regulators is extremely
important.
New FDIC Guidelines Issued to Clarify the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and
Officers, FDIC FIL-87-92 (Dec. 17, 1992), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
rules/5000-3300.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) [hereinafter FDIC Guidelines]
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also OCC, THE DIRECTOR’S
BOOK 10–17, 19–47 (2010), http://www.occ.gov /publications/publications-bytype/other-publications-reports/The-Directors-Book.pdf
(articulating
similar
standards applicable to federally chartered depository institutions).
315. FDIC Guidelines, supra note 314.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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experience and talents enable them to exercise sound and prudent
judgment.” 318 The FDIC speaks with particular authority in this
area because it is the sole federal regulator operating as a receiver
for insolvent depository institutions 319 and has a legal mandate to
pursue any fiduciary duty claims against former bank directors
and officers. 320 In this connection, the FDIC emphasizes that in
considering whether to pursue such claims it will assess whether
managers complied with laws, regulations, and supervisory
agreements or heeded regulator warnings. 321
The upshot of all of this is that the federal banking regulators
have broad power to address and remedy all issues relating to safe
and sound banking practices. Anytime an insured depository
institution engages in any unsafe or unsound practice, or is
operating in an unsafe and unsound condition, the federal banking
regulators can impose any conditions necessary to stem the risks
of such practice as part of their normal enforcement powers and
processes. 322
Nothing in Section 342 of the Dodd–Frank Act limits the
regulators’ power to address and remedy issues. Section 342 limits
the power to impose cultural diversity in only one way: “[N]othing
in [Section 342(b)] may be construed to mandate any requirement
on or otherwise affect the lending policies and practices of any
318. Id.
319. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (“The Corporation shall be
appointed receiver, and shall accept such appointment, whenever a receiver is
appointed for the purpose of liquidation or winding up the affairs of an insured
Federal depositor institution . . . .”).
320. See id. § 1821(k)(1)–(3) (enumerating the liabilities of bank directors and
officers).
321. See FDIC Guidelines, supra note 314 (stating that claims pursued often
involve “[c]ases where a director or officer was responsible for []failure . . . to
adhere to applicable laws and regulations” and that claims against “outside
directors either involve insider abuse or situations where the directors failed to
heed warnings . . . that there was a significant problem”). Between 1985 and
1992, the FDIC pursued claims against officers and directors about twenty-four
percent of the time a bank failed. Id.
322. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(F) (including the power to order the bank
to “take such other actions as the banking agency determines to be appropriate”
within the power to issue a cease and desist order); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(iii),
(b)(1) & (e)(1)(A)(i)(III)–(IV) (explaining that federal banking regulators always
retain the power to come to negotiated agreements with banks found to engage in
unsafe or unsound practices).
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regulated entity, or to require any specific action based on the
findings of the assessment.” 323 This sole limitation does not impact
the regulators’ preexisting power to address unsafe and unsound
banking practices and conditions, even if such violations also
implicate weak diversity policies and practices as part of the
unsafe or unsound banking practice and conditions. 324 The
regulators also traditionally exercised their remedial power
broadly and it would defy the intent of the political branches to
limit the reach of the federal regulators to address diversity in the
financial sector under the Dodd–Frank Act; they manifestly held
the opposite intent. 325 The SEC has similarly used its enforcement
powers to plumb the depths of internal governance at regulated
entities, as the next section of this Article will show.
B. The SEC and the Securities Industry
The SEC’s main concern is legal compliance and regulatory
risk. 326 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 78o gives the SEC power to revoke
323. Dodd–Frank Act § 342(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(4) (2012).
324. It is a fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that statutes
should be construed in harmony with preexisting statutes and the implied repeals
or limitations of pre-existing statutes are disfavored. See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (explaining that courts should
interpret the statutes as a “symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme” and
“fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole”); United States v. Spinelle, 41
F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550
(1974)); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification
for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are
irreconcilable.” (citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456–57
(1945))). Indeed, “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.” Id. at 551. See also Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels
Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Repeals by implication are
not favored in the law and are permitted only when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable.” (citing United States v. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th Cir.
1994))).
325. See supra note 229 (detailing the legislative intent behind the Dodd–
Frank Act).
326. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 126
(“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: require that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being
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the registration of broker-dealers, which is tantamount to the
corporate death penalty as a broker-dealer cannot operate without
an effective registration with the SEC. 327 For our purposes, the key
provision authorizing such revocation is Section 78o(b)(4), which
provides that suspension or revocation is authorized if either the
broker-dealer (or any person associated with the broker-dealer):
(1) commits any fraud-based crime; (2) is found civilly responsible
for fraud-related offenses; (3) is found to have willfully violated any
part of the federal securities laws or regulations thereunder; or, (4)
willfully aids and abets such violation. 328 Of course, like the
banking regulators, the SEC need not impose the corporate death
penalty. 329 The statute specifies that the SEC may impose any
“limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of . . . [the]
broker or dealer.” 330 Also, like the federal banking regulators, the
SEC has the power to permanently bar individuals found to have
violated the federal securities laws from the securities industry. 331
The SEC illustrated this point with its record-setting
settlement with Goldman, Sachs & Co. relating to its alleged
fraudulent sale of securities-related subprime mortgages. 332 Not
offered for public sale; and prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud
in the sale of securities.”).
327. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to place
restrictions on a broker’s registration).
328. See id. § 78o(b)(4)(A)–(H) (enumerating the situations under which the
SEC has the authority to suspend or revoke a broker’s registration).
329. See id. § 78o(b)(4) (providing the SEC options to censure, place
limitations on, suspend, or revoke broker registrations). There is an additional
layer of regulation in the securities industry. Specifically, all broker-dealers must
maintain membership in a self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See id. at § 78o(b)(8) (requiring broker-dealers to
register pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3—with a self-regulatory organization—
before the broker-dealer may affect any transaction).
330. Id. § 78o(b)(4).
331. See id. § 78o(b)(6) (“[T]he Commission, by order, shall censure, place
limitations on the activities of such person, or suspend for a period not exceeding
12 months, or bar any such person . . . .”).
332. See Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm (last updated July 15, 2010)
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“Half a billion dollars is the largest penalty ever
assessed against a financial services firm in the history of the SEC . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

1862

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016)

only did Goldman pay $550 million to settle the claims of the SEC,
it also acknowledged that material misrepresentations occurred in
connection with the marketing of such securities and agreed to
internal governance reforms. 333 More specifically, it agreed to:
[R]emedial action . . . in its review and approval of offerings of
certain mortgage securities. This includes the role and
responsibilities of internal legal counsel, compliance personnel,
and outside counsel in the review of written marketing
materials for such offerings. The settlement also requires
additional education and training of Goldman employees in this
area of the firm’s business. 334

This settlement thus demonstrates again the power of the federal
financial regulators over the internal governance of firms they
regulate. 335
The SEC regulates many entities beyond just broker-dealers.
Indeed, the Joint Guidelines identify the SEC as the agency with
the greatest number of regulated entities subject to the
guidelines. 336 The regulated entities subject to the Joint Guidelines
and SEC regulation include: investment advisers, investment
companies, self-regulatory organizations (such as the NYSE),
333. See id. (“In agreeing to the SEC’s largest-ever penalty paid by a Wall
Street firm, Goldman also acknowledged that its marketing materials for the
subprime product contained incomplete information.”).
334. Id.
335. More recently, the SEC settled charges with Merrill Lynch regarding its
record keeping obligations for $11 million. See Merrill Lynch Admits Using
Inaccurate Data for Short Sale Orders, Agrees to $11 Million Settlement, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/ 2015-105.html (last
updated June 1, 2015) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (detailing a SEC action against
Merrill Lynch) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Merrill also
agreed to hire an independent consultant to assist in future record keeping
obligations. Id. Merrill Lynch previously settled similar record keeping charges
for $131 million involving claims that it had misled investors with respect to
securities offerings. See SEC Charges Merrill Lynch with Misleading Investors in
CDOs, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press
Release/1370540492377 (last updated Dec. 12, 2013) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016)
(detailing charged filed by the SEC against Merrill Lynch regarding an alleged
failure to provide information to investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
336. See Joint Guidelines, supra note 44, at 33021 (explaining how the SEC
estimated that 1,250 of its regulated entities would respond to a survey regarding
diversity policies, which is 500 more respondents than the next closest agency).
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rating agencies, and certain institutions involved in derivatives
markets. 337 The SEC regulatory scheme with respect to each of
these different types of financial institutions differs in important
ways. 338 However, there are many common themes: each of these
types of entities must register with the SEC; the SEC holds the
power to revoke such registrations for a variety of reasons,
including legal and regulatory violations; and the SEC conducts
periodic examinations of each type of regulated entity. 339
Invariably, the SEC may also take action short of revoking
registrations, which operates as a corporate death penalty. 340
An example of the SEC’s power to influence regulated entities
is in its enforcement action against an investment company,
Putnam Investment Management LLC. In late 2003, SEC settled
claims against Putnam relating to alleged violations of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 341 and the Investment Company
Act of 1940. 342 The Commission found that Putnam committed
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in the
form of mutual fund shares. 343 Putnam failed to disclose self337. See id. at 33020 n.6 (listing the primary federal financial regulator for
various institutions identified in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)).
338. See What We Do, supra note 127 (describing the manner in which various
industries are regulated).
339. See id. (“The Act also identified and prohibits certain types of conduct in
the markets and provides the Commission with disciplinary powers over
regulated entities and persons associated with them.”).
340. An example of this power is 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(4), discussed above.
341. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000). The Court
termed that the intent of the Investment Advisers Act—like the federal securities
laws in general—“was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The Act accomplished this through broad anti-fraud
provisions that supported private claims and registration of investment advisers.
See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Arthur B. Laby, SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 1051, 1081–82 (2011).
342. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000).
343. See In re Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act, S.E.C.
Release No. 2192, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11317, 2003 WL
22683975, at *6 (Nov. 13, 2003) (“[W]hile acting as an investment advisor,
[Putnam] employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud clients or prospective
clients . . . .”).
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dealing securities trading—using non-pubic information to engage
in market-timing—by several of its employees to investors in the
mutual funds. 344 The Commission further found that Putnam
failed to detect and deter such trading activity through internal
controls and failed to supervise its investment management
professionals. 345 Putnam consented to the entry of the
Commission's order without admitting or denying its findings and
agreed not to contest the SEC’s findings. 346 It ultimately paid $55
million to settle the SEC claims. 347
More importantly, for purposes of this Article, the SEC
demanded, and Putnam agreed to, a series of wide-ranging
corporate governance reforms. 348 Putnam agreed to enhance the
independence of its board, enhance shareholder voting power and
disclosures, and supply support staff to board members to assist in
their monitoring duties. 349 The firm also agreed to make certain
enhancements to its compliance including the creation of a
reporting obligation from the firm’s chief compliance officer to the
board, the creation of new committees for ethics and compliance,
and the periodic retention of an independent consultant to review
compliance policies and procedures. 350 Thus, like the federal bank
344. In re Putnam Investments LLC, Administrative Proceeding No. 3-11317,
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia2192.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Putnam Agrees to Pay $55 Million to Resolve SEC Enforcement
Action Related to Market Timing by Portfolio Managers, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-49.htm (last
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (announcing Putnam’s agreement to pay a fifty-million
dollar penalty and five-million dollar disgorgement) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
348. See id. (“Putnam agreed to undertake significant and far-reaching
corporate governance, compliance, and ethics reforms.”)
349. See Putnam Agrees to Make Restitution and Implement Immediate,
Significant Structural Reforms in Partial Resolution of SEC Enforcement Action,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2003156.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (describing Putnam’s reforms as an effort to
make “real and substantial” reforms in order to better protect mutual fund
investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
350. See id. (enumerating the various areas of compliance Putnam agreed to
reform as a result of the SEC’s order).
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regulators, the SEC routinely exercises its regulatory power to
achieve superior compliance, risk management, and corporate
governance in wayward registrants and regulated entities. 351
The federal financial regulators, however, segregated the
issue of diversity to the extreme margins of their respective
regulatory activities, examinations, and regulatory processes. As
previously mentioned, the Dodd–Frank Act directs the federal
financial regulators to promulgate standards for “assessing the
diversity policies” of regulated entities, and the regulators turned
away from the plain meaning of the statute to create a “selfassessment.” 352 Congress could not have meant “self-assessment,”
otherwise there would be no need for the statutory language in
Section 342(b)(4) of the Dodd–Frank Act, stating that the
assessment could not alone be used for any mandate regarding
“lending policies” or “to require any specific action based on the
findings of the assessment.” 353 This provision is meaningless and
redundant in the context of self-assessments. 354 Worse, the federal
financial regulators state within the Joint Guidelines that “[t]he
agencies will not use their examination or supervisory processes in
connection with these Standards.” 355 Further, the agencies state
that the Joint Guidelines do not “create any new legal
obligation.” 356 It is as if Congress simply directed the agencies to
promulgate voluntary guidelines for regulated entities to
undertake self-assessments of optional diversity policies.
351. See, e.g., supra notes 343–350 and accompanying text (outlining the
SEC’s enforcement action against Putnam).
352. Compare Dodd–Frank Act § 342(b)(2)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2)(C)
(2012) (requiring the federal financial regulators to create standards for
“assessing the diversity policies and practices of entities regulated by the
agency”), with Joint Guidelines, supra note 44, at 33024 (“[T]he agencies interpret
the term ‘assessment’ to mean self-assessment.”). Congress did not use the term
“self-assessment.” 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2)(C) (2012).
353. Dodd–Frank Act § 342(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(4).
354. In general, statutes should be construed in a way that avoids rendering
any provision meaningless or surplus. This interpretation “flouts the rule that a
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, [and] no
part will be inoperative or superfluous.” Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248
(2014) (internal quotations omitted).
355. Joint Guidelines, supra note 44, at 33.
356. Id.
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We suggest an alternative to breathe life into Section 342 in
accordance with the plain meaning of Section 342. In accordance
with the preexisting powers held by the federal financial
regulators (discussed above), 357 federal financial regulators should
use their examination and supervisory powers to assess the
diversity policies of regulated entities under the standards
promulgated in the Joint Guidelines. 358 Then, if those policies are
sufficiently deficient that they form a basis—combined with all
other facts and deficiencies found by the regulators—for adverse
comments in examination reports, then such deficiencies should be
treated as any other regulatory issue. 359 Finally, in seeking to
enhance risk management, legal and regulatory compliance, as
well as ethicality, the regulators should require more aggressive
efforts at diversification at miscreant firms that violate laws and
regulations related to those areas. This approach effectively
vindicates the act of Congress.
It also vindicates the essential purpose of the Dodd–Frank Act
overall. Based upon the empirical evidence developed in Part III of
this Article, diversity is essential to appropriate risk management,
particularly compliance and ethics risk management.
Consequently,
sound
diversity
management
vindicates
macroprudential regulation, macroeconomic stability and growth,
and the essential publicness of the financial sector. In sum, our
357. See supra notes 322–325 and accompanying text (analyzing the power of
federal regulators in depth).
358. This would encourage but not mandate diversity policies. The courts
themselves already encourage such policies in every firm subject to Title VII. See
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 744–46 (1998) (articulating defense
for Title VII vicarious liability for firms with appropriate policies); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) (holding as a matter of law that the
City of Boca Raton could not establish the defense because it had failed to
disseminate the policy to all of its employees, and its policy failed to include a
provision allowing the complaining person to bypass the harassing supervisor);
Allen v. Mich. Dep’t. of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 409–12 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that
an African American was the victim of unreasonable abusive and offensive racial
harassment and extending the above holdings to the race discrimination context);
Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 127, 164–65 (2000) (reviewing case law regarding diversity policies,
harassment, and hostile work environment).
359. Implicit in this approach is that diversity policy deficiencies standing
alone, with no threat of serious risk of loss, are not a matter of regulatory concern.
This fully actualizes Section 342(b)(4).
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approach squares the statutory language of Section 342 with the
essential purposes of Dodd–Frank and the best learning extant on
the potential of cultural diversity.
VII. Conclusion
Congress correctly identified a major blind spot on Wall
Street—a culturally homogenous elite prone to herd behavior,
groupthink, and affinity bias. 360 These maladies exacted a heavy
cost upon the rest of the nation in the context of the financial crisis,
which was marked by a mindless real estate bubble, dubious
ethics, outright violations of laws and regulations, and the worst
risk mismanagement in our nation’s history. There is no certainty
that a more culturally diverse financial sector would have entirely
prevented the crisis or dramatically lessened its effects. Embracing
the full spectrum of cultural diversity allows firms to access and
balance the full spectrum of perspectives and experiences that
support superior cognition, especially with respect to risk, ethics,
and compliance.
Nevertheless, empirical studies strongly suggest that a more
culturally diverse financial sector could have reduced subprime
lending, limited the extent of the real estate bubble, limited the
essential lawlessness of the financial sector, and enhanced ethical
decision making. 361 These empirical studies are either based upon
actual learning from the financial crisis or sophisticated
experiments simulating market behavior. 362 While omitted
variables can never be ruled out and disentangling causation from
mere correlation is always challenging, the studies carefully
control for many factors and boast careful designs expressly to
360. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (exploring the difficulties
and ramifications of group think and herd behavior in financial institutions).
361. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (reviewing multiple studies
that point to correlation between increased gender diversity and positive business
outcomes).
362. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text (summarizing multiple
studies that illustrate the difference between diverse and non-diverse governance
results, as well as differences in perception between white males and people of
other backgrounds).
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limit such concerns. 363 In all events, a thoroughgoing embrace of
cultural diversity will certainly yield superior social and economic
outcomes relative to the financial crisis yielded by culturally
monolithic financial firms. Viewed from the perspective of that
crisis in capitalism, it is impossible for cultural diversity to fail.
Consequently, we suggest that the financial regulators modify
the basic approach of the Joint Guidelines and fully integrate them
into all aspects of their examination and supervisory processes.
Further, firms should face legal obligations with respect to
diversity to the extent that mismanagement of diversity
contributes to unsafe and unsound practices or creates an
environment and culture of unlawful conduct. The regulators
should also proactively require stronger diversity measures for
firms sanctioned for unlawful behavior or risk mismanagement as
part of negotiated enforcement outcomes.
This more robust approach to Congress’s directive with respect
to diversity is far more consistent with the plain meaning of
Section 342. It also fully vindicates the macroeconomic,
macroprudential, and publicness concerns that animate the Dodd–
Frank Act. A more diverse financial sector is bound to allocate
capital better, achieve greater systemic stability, and meet the
public’s expectations of the financial sector.

363. See supra note 56 (“After controlling for size, industry, and other
corporate governance measures, we find statistically significant positive
relationships between the presence of women or minorities on the board and firm
value . . . .”).

